Superficially, Taiwan looks stable, calm, even a little boring. Its people are mostly prosperous, with gross domestic capital per capita of more than $30,000 — not as high as Singapore or Hong Kong but well ahead of South Korea and most of the rest of Asia. Growth, while no longer spectacular, is chugging along at slightly more than 3 per cent a year and inflation is under control.
表面看来,台湾显得稳定、平静,甚至有点乏味。台湾民众大多富足,人均GDP超过3万美元,虽然没有新加坡或香港高,但远远超过韩国和亚洲其他大部分国家。尽管增长不再引人注目,但依然以每年略超过3%的增速缓慢前行,而且通胀也处于可控之中。
The central bank has kept interest rates steady at a marvellously precise 1.875 per cent since July 2011 and Medley1 Global Advisors2, a macro research service owned by the FT, expects it to stand pat for at least the rest of this year.
自2011年7月以来,台湾央行一直令人不可思议地将利率精确地稳定在1.875%的水平之上。英国《金融时报》旗下的宏观研究服务机构Medley Global Advisors预计,台湾央行至少在今年剩余时间将会维持现状。
Dig a little deeper, though, and Taiwan is battling to retool3 a mercantilist economic model that is no longer working well either for it or, indeed, for many of its regional peers. The island’s exports have dropped every month so far this year and are now expected to shrink 2.6 per cent in 2015, the first contraction4 since the crisis year of 2009.
但再稍微深入探究一下,就会发现台湾正在努力改变重商主义的经济模式——这种模式不再适用于台湾,实际上也不再适用于亚洲的许多国家。今年以来,台湾的出口每个月都在下降,预计2015年将收缩2.6%,创下自2009年危机以来的首次收缩。
While some of that can be blamed on an anaemic global recovery and weakness in mainland China specifically, the truth is that Taiwan’s largely anonymous5 component6 suppliers and middlemen are losing out to branded rivals in Korea and Japan. And the strength of the Taiwan dollar against both won and yen7 is certainly not helping8.
尽管这一点可部分归咎于全球经济复苏乏力,特别是中国大陆经济低迷,但真实情况是,面对韩国和日本的那些大名鼎鼎的竞争对手,台湾基本上默默无闻的配件供应商和经销商正在败下阵来。新台币对韩元和日元的走强当然没有起到好的作用。
Politically, too, the calm is superficial. Domestically, the former authoritarian9 nation has turned into a rowdy democracy, where half a million people marched in the streets last year and activists10 stormed parliament. Geopolitically, Taiwan is caught between the economic and cultural pull of the mainland, which has sworn to eventually reunite with it, and a growing sense of independence from China, underpinned11 by the US pledge to come to its military aid if necessary.
就内部而言,这个曾经的威权国家已转向吵闹的民主体制,去年曾有50万人上街游行,活动人士还冲击了议会。从地缘政治方面来说,台湾一方面受到大陆在经济和文化上的吸引(大陆方面誓言最终要与台湾实现统一),另一方面它的独立意识越来越强,美国承诺在必要时提供军事支援,也对这种意识提供了支撑。
These tensions will come to a head again in the run-up to next January’s presidential elections, likely to be won by Tsai Ing-wen from the opposition12 Democratic Progressive party — who has been denounced as a “splittist” by Beijing. Under a President Tsai, further economic integration13 with the mainland would be unlikely, to put it mildly.
这些紧张因素将在明年1月总统大选前夕再次到达紧要关头。来自反对党民进党、被北京方面指责为“分裂分子”的的蔡英文(Tsai Ing-wen)可能会在大选中胜出。如果蔡英文当选总统,往轻了说,台湾与大陆的进一步经济融合将变得不太可能。
Which leaves investors14 in a tricky15 position. Over the medium term, there is scope to raise the country’s potential growth rate by opening up the service sector16, investing in infrastructure17 and education and promoting other supply-side reforms. More immediately, policy makers18 are talking about relaxing fiscal19 policy next year in order to boost economic expansion.
这让投资者感到棘手。中期而言,通过开放服务业、投资基础设施和教育以及推动其他供应方面的改革,台湾仍有提高潜在增长率的空间。就现在而言,政策制定者在讨论明年放松财政政策以促进经济增长。
Against that, however, the central bank will have to raise rates at some point if only to follow the US Federal Reserve. While it can use open market interventions20 to keep the currency reasonably stable at about 31 to the US dollar, the island’s exporters are likely to continue to lose competitiveness to the Samsungs of this world. Higher borrowing costs are also likely to constrain21 consumption given household debt at more than 80 per cent of GDP.
然而,与此相悖的是,台湾央行将不得不在某个时候跟随美联储(Fed)加息。尽管台湾央行可以通过公开市场操作进行干预,将新台币兑美元汇率相对稳定地保持在约1美元兑31新台币的水平上,但台湾出口商面对三星(Samsungs)可能将继续丧失竞争力。鉴于家庭债务与GDP的比率超过80%,借款成本上升也可能抑制消费。
So a steady performance is probably the best that can be expected from Taiwanese assets?.?.?.?which is unexciting.
因此可以预计台湾资产最好的表现很可能是中规中矩……这并不令人兴奋。
1
medley [ˈmedli]
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n.混合 | |
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advisors [ædˈvaɪzəz]
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n.顾问,劝告者( advisor的名词复数 );(指导大学新生学科问题等的)指导教授 | |
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retool [ˌri:ˈtu:l]
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vt. 重组;重新装备 vi. 更换工具;重新装备;更换机械设备 | |
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contraction [kənˈtrækʃn]
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n.缩略词,缩写式,害病 | |
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anonymous [əˈnɒnɪməs]
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adj.无名的;匿名的;无特色的 | |
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component [kəmˈpəʊnənt]
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n.组成部分,成分,元件;adj.组成的,合成的 | |
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yen [jen]
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n. 日元;热望 | |
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helping [ˈhelpɪŋ]
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n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的,辅助的 | |
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authoritarian [ɔ:ˌθɒrɪˈteəriən]
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n./adj.专制(的),专制主义者,独裁主义者 | |
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activists ['æktɪvɪsts]
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n.(政治活动的)积极分子,活动家( activist的名词复数 ) | |
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underpinned [ˌʌndəˈpɪnd]
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v.用砖石结构等从下面支撑(墙等)( underpin的过去式和过去分词 );加固(墙等)的基础;为(论据、主张等)打下基础;加强 | |
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opposition [ˌɒpəˈzɪʃn]
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n.反对,敌对 | |
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integration [ˌɪntɪˈgreɪʃn]
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n.一体化,联合,结合 | |
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investors [ɪn'vestəz]
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n.投资者,出资者( investor的名词复数 ) | |
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tricky [ˈtrɪki]
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adj.狡猾的,奸诈的;(工作等)棘手的,微妙的 | |
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sector [ˈsektə(r)]
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n.部门,部分;防御地段,防区;扇形 | |
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infrastructure [ˈɪnfrəstrʌktʃə(r)]
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n.下部构造,下部组织,基础结构,基础设施 | |
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makers []
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n.制造者,制造商(maker的复数形式) | |
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fiscal [ˈfɪskl]
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adj.财政的,会计的,国库的,国库岁入的 | |
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interventions [ɪntə'venʃnz]
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n.介入,干涉,干预( intervention的名词复数 ) | |
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