The causes and consequences of the long-running inflation of profits by Toshiba reflect some uniquely Japanese cultural norms. So, inevitably¹, did the 2011 scandal at Olympus, where successive leaders covered up accounting² manipulation.

东芝(Toshiba)长期虚报利润的原因和后果，反映出日本一些独特的文化习俗。奥林巴斯(Olympus)2011年爆出的丑闻也必然如此。奥林巴斯曾有连续数位掌门人掩盖会计操纵的问题。

But the genetic³ traces of those debacles are visible in plenty of other countries and companies. Self-satisfied boards of non-Japanese companies should examine the flaws that are common to all corporate⁴ cultures — almost certainly including their own.

但是，这类溃败背后的基因痕迹在很多其他国家和企业都能看到。非日本企业洋洋自得的董事会应该对所有企业文化中常见的缺点进行检查——几乎肯定包括了它们自己的企业文化。

After all, there are only so many ways of cooking the books, however varied⁵ the details of each case. In the introduction to his indispensable anthology of creative accounting, Michael Jones, a professor of financial reporting, identifies just four main strategies — increasing income, decreasing expenses, increasing assets and decreasing liabilities. Toshiba was doing the first, according to an independent report — but so, for example, was WorldCom, one of the most notorious US cases of accounting fraud, back in the early 2000s.

毕竟，作假账的方式太多了，不过每种情况的细节有所不同。财务申报方面的教授迈克尔琼斯(Michael Jones)在介绍伪造账目方面不可或缺的选集时，指明了4种主要策略——增加收入、减少支出、增加资产以及减少负债。据一份独立报告称，东芝使用的是第一种手法——不过，举个例子，世通(WorldCom)也是这么做的，它是21世纪初最臭名昭著的美国假账案之一。

Control failings are one common theme. The audit⁶ committee at Toshiba includes executive directors — a red flag to UK governance purists. But directors, auditors⁷ and risk managers can succumb⁸ to capture or groupthink anywhere. It took the financial crisis to enshrine the idea that UK banks’ chief risk officers should be more independent, for instance.

控制失败是一种常见主题。东芝的审计委员会中包含执行董事——这对英国的公司治理纯粹主义者来说是一个危险信号。但是，在任何地方，董事、审计员和风险管理者都可能会屈服于群体思维，或者被监督对象所俘虏。只有经历了金融危机才能铭记住这类观点——比如，英国银行的首席风险官应该更加独立。

As for lack of objective supervision⁹, the UK principle that chief executives should be overseen¹⁰ by an independent chairman is widely ignored in the US. When boards do split the roles, it is often to give the former chief executive a stepping stone to retirement¹¹, an echo of the way former Toshiba and Olympus executives clung on to influence over their companies after they left. Even in the UK, companies are only one emergency decision or succession crisis away from appointing an executive chairman.

至于缺乏客观监督方面，英国对首席执行官应接受独立董事长监督的原则，在美国被广泛忽略。当董事会的确让不同的人担任这两个角色，这通常是给前任首席执行官一块通往退休的垫脚石——这与东芝和奥林巴斯前首席执行官在离任后不愿放弃对公司影响力的情况相呼应。即便在英国，如果企业需要做紧急决定或是遭遇继任危机，也会任命一位执行董事长。

Unwillingness¹² to challenge authority, a trait attributed to employees at Toshiba and Olympus — and often given an “only in Japan” spin — is a recurring¹³ problem everywhere, from Royal Bank of Scotland under Fred Goodwin to Fifa under Sepp Blatter.

不愿挑战权威——这被认为是东芝和奥林巴斯的员工身上的特性，而且常被贴上“只出现在日本”的标签——是世界各地反复出现的问题，无论弗雷德古德温爵士(Sir Fred Goodwin)执掌时的苏格兰皇家银行(RBS)还是塞普布拉特(Sepp Blatter)领导的国际足联(Fifa)都不例外。

The assumption that non-Japanese companies benefit from the protection of more advanced governance codes is broadly true. But such armour¹⁴ can be paper-thin if not reinforced in practice. Enron was technically¹⁵ in line with US boardroom practice. Toshiba was itself held up as a model of governance. It started appointing outside directors to its board long before the Olympus fiasco prompted wider corporate reform in Japan.

非日本企业受益于更先进的治理法范的保护——这种设想基本是正确的。但是，这种保护性的盔甲可能会形同虚设，如果没能在实践中加固的话。在法律层面，安然(Enron)与美国董事会的做法一致。东芝本身被树立为公司治理的典范。该公司任命外部董事进入董事会的做法，远早于奥林巴斯惨剧在日本引发全面企业改革。

The most important lesson from Toshiba is about the malign¹⁶ impact of top-down pressure to meet unrealistic targets. Toshiba’s ex-chief executive denies having given direct instructions to staff to inflate¹⁷ profits. But the investigating panel said he told executives to “use every possible measure to achieve profitability” and added that Toshiba’s corporate culture did “not allow employees to go against the will of their superiors”.

从东芝得到的最重要教训是，为达到不切实际的目标而由上而下施加压力，会带来不利影响。东芝前首席执行官否认直接向员工作出虚报利润的指示。但是，调查委员会称，他曾向高管表示“利用一切可能的手段来实现盈利”，该委员会还补充称，东芝的企业文化“不允许员工违背上级意愿”。

Staff at target-chasing western banks before the credit crunch¹⁸ or at WorldCom ahead of its collapse¹⁹ in 2002 may recognise that picture. Bernie Ebbers, the telecoms group’s chief executive, “created, and the [then] board permitted, a corporate environment in which the pressure to meet the numbers was high, the departments that served as controls were weak, and the word of senior management was final and not to be challenged”, a WorldCom board investigation²⁰ found in 2003.

信贷紧缩前在追逐目标的西方银行业工作的员工、或者世通2002年破产前的员工，也许会觉得这画面似曾相识。2003年对世通董事会所做的一份调查发现，时任该电信集团首席执行官的伯尼埃伯斯 (Bernie Ebbers)“创造了（董事会随后允许了）一种企业环境——完成业绩数字的压力很大、承担控制职能的部门很弱、高管层的指示毋庸置疑，不会受到挑战”。

If the Toshiba report were just a snapshot of how some Japanese companies are fossilised relics²¹ of what corporate governance used to look like elsewhere, the rest of the world could rest easy. But the rest of the world should not be so smug. A new survey suggests that internationally, 37 per cent of management accountants, who help companies seek out investments and control risks, have felt under pressure from managers or peers to compromise corporate ethics²². The percentage has risen over the past three years in most places polled, including the UK and the US.

如果这份关于东芝的报告仅仅揭示出，有些日本企业正是其他地方以往公司治理面貌的“化石遗址”，那么世界其他地方便可高枕无忧。但是，世界其他地方不应该如此安然自得。一份新调查显示，全球37%的管理会计师（负责帮助企业寻找投资并控制风险）已经感觉到来自经理或同侪的、让其放弃企业伦理的压力。在绝大多数接受调查的地区——包括英国和美国——这一比例在过去三年均有所上升。

When aggressive targets, irresistible²³ management pressure and weak controls coincide, misconduct can spread quickly. Rival companies see the inflated²⁴ numbers and strain to match them. To suggest such weaknesses are confined to one corporate or national culture is a first step into dangerous complacency.

当激进的目标、不可抗拒的管理压力以及控制薄弱同时出现时，不端行为便会迅速蔓延。对手企业看到虚报的数字，就会想方设法报出差不多的数字。认为这种嗜好为某一家企业或某种民族文化所独有，就是步入危险自负的第一步。