Political systems in the developed world are processing the economic challenges of globalisation and technology in dangerous ways.

发达世界的政治体系正在以危险的方式处理全球化和技术带来的经济挑战。

Although it’s happening with distinct local flavors, the recent phenomena¹ of fringe parties and extreme personalities² rising to power (or getting close) in places like Greece, France, Spain and even the US are all part of the same global trend.

尽管地方特色各有不同，但最近希腊、法国、西班牙乃至美国等国的边缘党派和极端人士攀上（或者接近）权力顶峰的现象，全都是这种相同全球趋势的一部分。

It is nothing new to the world that inward-looking populism and confrontational³ nationalism become a growing force after episodes of economic disruption.

在当今世界，这不是什么新鲜事——每当爆发经济危机之后，内向的民粹主义和对抗性民族主义就会日益崛起。

While Brexit may be the most important global political event since the fall of the Soviet⁴ Union, it’s also a reminder⁵ of the popular mood in sophisticated and prosperous places like the UK.

英国退欧可能是自苏联解体以来最重要的全球政治事件，它还提醒人们，在英国这样成熟和富裕的地方同样存在民粹主义情绪。

In this context, the question has to be asked: When and how will this political tsunami⁶ hit emerging economies? And why haven’t emerging markets (EM) yet experienced the type of neo-populism seen in developed markets (DM) in a serious way?

在这种背景下，我们必须要问，这种政治海啸什么时候以及将如何冲击新兴经济体？为什么新兴市场迄今仍未真正遭遇发达市场的那种新民粹主义？

Unlike traditional EM populism, most notorious in Latin America, the recent wave in the developed world is different in that it may be more ideological⁷, more prosperous, more sophisticated and less cyclical.

发达世界最近兴起的民粹主义浪潮与过去的新兴市场民粹主义（名声最差的是拉美）不同，它们的意识形态色彩可能更为浓厚、它们所处的经济更为富足、它们本身更为复杂而周期性更弱。

A big part of this trend is explained by the xenophobic reaction to growing migration⁸ but it is also driven fundamentally by an economic agenda: instead of being about poor people, as has been the case traditionally in EM, it is more about middle-income citizens feeling left out or disappointed by falling income levels.

这种趋势在很大程度上源于对日益增多的移民的排外情绪，但它的根本原因也在于一个经济因素：它更多的与因收入水平下降而感觉被遗忘或者失望的中等收入民众有关，而不是像过去新兴市场那样与穷人有关。

Traditionally in EM we’ve seen populist movements that gain power to achieve justice for the poor.

过去，我们在新兴市场看到民粹主义运动获得权力，为穷人实现正义。

This may be a reason why populism traditionally has come hand in hand with fiscal⁹ irresponsibility and, because of that, populism has been a cyclical factor in EM.

这可能是民粹主义传统上与财政失责密切相关的一个原因，而且正因此，民粹主义一直是新兴市场的一个周期性因素。

Whenever money has been available there has also been a messianic politician with a plan.

只要有钱，总会出现一个有所谋划的救世主政客。

Of course, it may just be a matter of time before neo-populism finds its way to EM.

当然，新民粹主义抵达新兴市场可能只是时间问题。

But one has to consider that the initial conditions, in terms of GDP per capita, are very different in EM compared with DM.

但人们应该考虑，就人均GDP而言，新兴市场和发达市场的初始情况截然不同。

Over the last 20 years the EM citizen has had a great run towards prosperity and therefore the potential to accommodate lower per capita GDP growth rates or even a decline may be significant (think of the resilience of Ireland through the European crisis).

在过去20年里，新兴市场民众富裕程度大大提高，从而有很大的潜力适应人均GDP增长率减缓乃至下降的局面（想想爱尔兰在欧洲危机期间的适应能力吧）。

In a sense, while growing inequality within countries may be at the core of the neo-populist wave in DM, global inequality has been trending down, as the GDP per capita of EM economies has been catching¹⁰ up to their DM counterparts.

从某种意义上来说，尽管各国不平等程度日益加剧可能是发达市场新民粹主义浪潮的核心因素，但全球不平等正逐渐下降，因为新兴经济体的人均GDP已经在追上发达市场。

Along the same lines, immigration has not been a generalised challenge for emerging economies, which implies that the potential for extremist, isolationist behaviour should be limited.

同样，移民并非新兴经济体普遍面临的挑战，这意味着极端主义、孤立主义行为发生的可能性应该是有限的。

To be fair, one could argue that there is already some sort of neo-populism going on in EM, most notably¹¹ in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia, driven by ideology¹² but mostly by fiscally¹³ conservative governments.

诚然，人们可以辩称，新兴市场（尤其是匈牙利、波兰、斯洛伐克和俄罗斯）已经出现了某种新民粹主义，它一定程度上是由意识形态驱动，但主要是由财政上保守的政府造成。

After its failed coup¹⁴, Turkey appears also to be moving in the same direction.

在未遂政变之后，土耳其似乎也在转向相同方向。

Can this be a sign of a more generalised trend developing?

但这是更为普遍的趋势正在发展的迹象吗？

Maybe.

或许吧。

But it will be very difficult for it to become widespread because of one major factor: China.

但这种新民粹主义很难广泛传播，一个主要因素是中国。

Many years ago China made an important strategic decision to engage with the world as part of its economic and political model.

许多年前，中国做出重要的战略决定，将与世界接触作为其经济和政治模式的一部分。

First, as a way to generate prosperity through manufacturing exports when it entered the WTO in 2000.

最初中国在2001年加入世贸组织(WTO)的时候，是为了通过制造业出口来创造繁荣。

And more recently, taking a proactive role to reshape the global order by creating new multilateral institutions and support programs such as the Asian Infrastructure¹⁵ Development Bank and China’s One Belt, One Road initiative.

最近中国则积极重塑全球秩序，创建新的多边机构并支持亚洲基础设施投资银行(AIIB)和一带一路等项目。

It is unclear how deeply Chinese authorities believe in open markets and cooperation.

目前尚不清楚中国当局在多大程度上相信开放市场和合作。

So far they have benefited tremendously from global trade and the ability to be the factory of the world.

迄今中国极大地受益于全球贸易和成功成为世界工厂。

While doing that, they have also pursued other isolationist and confrontational policies, most recently through their gunboat diplomacy¹⁶ in the South China Sea.

与此同时，中国当局也出台了孤立主义和对抗政策，最近则是在南中国海上奉行炮艇外交。

It remains¹⁷ to be seen if their embracing of global trade will withstand growing pressures from technology to middle income wages.

他们对全球贸易的支持是否会经受住从技术到中等收入薪资等日益增长的压力，还有待观察。

But it could be that in the context of the declining power of major developed economies, China may become a major force for cooperation and multilateralism at a time of divisiveness and isolationism in the west: the world turned upside-down.

但在主要发达经济体影响力日益下降的背景下，在西方盛行分裂和孤立主义之时，中国可能成为合作和多边主义的主要倡导者：世界颠倒了。