China will join the exclusive club of hard currency issuing countries when its currency, the renminbi, becomes a fully fledged member of the IMF’s special drawing right basket on October 1.

今年10月1日，人民币将成为国际货币基金组织(IMF)特别提款权(SDR)货币篮子的正式成员，中国自此将加入硬通货发行国的高级俱乐部。

But what does this really mean? And why do people think the move could be supportive for the renminbi? And more importantly, would it really?

但这究竟意味着什么？人们为什么认为此举会对人民币起到支撑作用？更重要的是，真的会这样吗？

Julian Evans-Pritchard and Mark Williams at Capital Economics make a strong argument on Monday that most likely it wouldn’t.

凯投宏观(Capital Economics)的朱利安•埃文斯-普里查德(Julian Evans-Pritchar)和马克•威廉姆斯(Mark Williams)周一提出了一个强有力的论点，认为情况很可能并非如此。

To the contrary, they believe the inclusion will mostly mean Chinese government bond yields are factored into the calculation of interest earned or paid on countries’ SDR imbalances (every country is given a quota¹ of SDRs, and whether they are above or below that quota governs whether they pay or receive interest).

相反，他们认为，最有可能的情况是，在计算SDR利率的时候将需要考虑中国国债收益率（每个成员国都被给予一个SDR配额，如果某一国持有的SDR超过其配额，超额部分可以获得利息收入；反之，低于份额的部分就要支付利息）。

As the economists² note, SDRs are treated as a potential claim on the underlying³ cash liquidity⁴ represented by the currencies that make up the basket.

正如经济学家指出的，SDR被视作一种潜在权利，即成员国有权获取SDR篮子中各种货币的基础现金流动性。

In that context, the RMB’s inclusion only means IMF members will now have the option of selling SDRs in exchange for renminbi liquidity.

就此而言，人民币被纳入SDR只意味着IMF成员国有了出售SDR换取人民币流动性的选择权。

Their decision to engage in such a conversion⁵, however, is entirely⁶ dependent on whether they are facing balance of payment strains in that underlying currency.

然而，它们是否决定要进行这样的兑换，完全取决于它们在这种基础货币方面是否存在国际收支压力。

Thus far, however, this is unlikely because the renminbi simply isn’t used enough in international trade to create such constraints⁷ and is also arguably too controlled and restricted to be attractive for use in trade:

就目前来说，它们不太可能换取人民币，因为人民币还没有在国际贸易中广泛使用到产生此类压力，并且人民币受管制过多，不利于吸引人们在贸易中使用人民币。

If anything, the renminbi’s chances of being taken seriously as a reserve asset have gone backwards⁸ over the past year or so.

即便人民币有可能被认真作为一项储备资产对待，这种可能性在过去一年左右的时间里也被削弱了。

China’s leadership responded to concerns about capital outflows by making it harder to move capital abroad and to worries about the collapse⁹ of an equity¹⁰ bubble by suspending trading in many shares – in effect preventing owners of assets from selling them.

中国领导层通过使资本更难转移至国外来回应对资本外流的担忧，通过让许多股票暂停交易——实际上是阻止资产所有人出售资产——来回应股市泡沫破裂的担忧。

Managers of foreign exchange reserves will think twice before entrusting¹¹ their country’s assets to policymakers who have shown themselves willing to steamroller the rights of investors¹² when it suits them.

外汇储备管理机构将会考虑再三，是否要将本国资产委托给有意碾压投资者权利——只要对自己有利——的政策制定者。

As a consequence¹³, Capital Economics notes the inclusion on October 1 could inadvertently be followed by a period of weakness for China’s currency because the impetus¹⁴ to keep it stable ahead of the inclusion will now be gone.

因此，凯投宏观指出，人民币在10月1日被纳入SDR后可能会在无意之中开启一段时期的疲弱，因为在加入SDR前使人民币保持稳定的动力将会消失。

Indeed, if the RMB really is overvalued vis-a-vis the natural flows of the market, it may just be that the PBoC is betting everything on SDR inclusion to overturn the dire¹⁵ state of capital flows — in the hope, of course, that most people don’t really understand how the SDR system works and might misinterpret it as intrinsically supportive.

实际上，如果说人民币确实被高估的话（相对于市场自然流动的状态下），那可能只是中国央行在孤注一掷地押注人民币被纳入SDR会扭转资本流动的糟糕状况——这无疑是在寄望于，大多数人并不真正明白SDR体系的运作方式、而误以为它在本质上会对人民币起到支撑作用。

Evans-Pritchard and Williams remind us that capital outflows during the past couple of months have put increased pressure on the renminbi to depreciate¹⁶ and the PBoC has stepped up intervention¹⁷ so that the currency remains¹⁸ broadly stable both against the dollar and in trade-weighted terms.

埃文斯-普里查德和威廉姆斯提醒我们，过去数月的资本外流加大了人民币贬值压力，中国央行加大了干预，从而使得人民币无论按兑美元计算还是按贸易加权计算，总体上依然保持稳定。

They conclude (their emphasis):

他们得出结论称（他们强调称）：

To be clear, we don’t expect a major shift in China’s exchange rate policy following SDR inclusion – a continued course of gradual and managed depreciation¹⁹ still looks most likely.

需要明确的是，我们预计中国汇率政策在人民币被纳入SDR后不会发生重大改变——看起来最有可能的仍然是人民币继续走有管理的渐进贬值之路。

Nonetheless, we think the potential upside to the currency from the SDR inclusion has been overstated and that, if anything, the short-run risks lie on the downside.

不过，我们认为，加入SDR对人民币的潜在利好被夸大，如果说有什么影响的话，短期而言也偏向于负面影响。

Markets, however, are not always rational, so it will be interesting to see what happens.

然而，市场并非总是理性的，看看接下来会发生什么情况将会非常有趣。