In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man rules.

盲人国度，独眼为王。

The US economy shows significant flaws.

虽然美国经济暴露出巨大缺陷，

But it is a king when compared with its peers.

但与其他经济体相比，美国仍可称王。

It has recovered from the Great Recession, with unemployment low and real incomes rising.

美国经济已从大衰退(Great Recession)中复苏，失业率处于较低水平，实际收入不断增长。

It also possesses abiding¹ supremacy² in new technologies.

美国还在新技术领域拥有根深蒂固的优势。

Nevertheless, the next administration will take over a country with mediocre³ growth of productivity, high inequality, a growing retreat from work and a declining rate of creation of new businesses and jobs.

然而，新一届美国政府将接管的是这样一个国度：生产率增长差强人意，社会不平等程度高，越来越多人放弃求职，新企业创立及就业新增的速度不断下降。

At least the US fiscal⁴ position is not a really urgent threat.

至少美国的财政状况还并非真正紧迫的威胁。

That is to the good, since nothing much is likely to be done about it.

这是件好事，因为对于财政问题，反正也不太可能做什么。

The financial crisis of 2007-09 was a devastating⁵ event, economically and politically.

2007-09年金融危机就经济和政治而言都是一场灾难。

But real gross domestic product per head had reached its trough by the second quarter of 2009 and recovered to pre-crisis levels by the final quarter of 2013.

但实际人均国内生产总值(GDP)已在2009年第二季度见底，并于2013年第四季度恢复至危机前水平。

Similarly, the unemployment rate peaked at 10 per cent in October 2009 but is now back to 4.9 per cent.

类似地，2009年10月，失业率升至10%的峰值，但现在已回落至4.9%。

The financial sector⁶ is also in far better health than during the crisis.

金融业的健康状况也已比危机期间好得多。

Too many casual observers take this rapid turnround for granted.

太多漫不经心的观察人士将这种快速的复苏视为理所当然。

But the Great Recession could have been another Great Depression.

但此次大衰退本来有可能演变成另一场大萧条(Great Depression)。

It took bold action by the Federal Reserve, the administration of George W Bush and that of Barack Obama to turn the economy around so quickly.

得益于美联储(Fed)、小布什(George W Bush)及巴拉克.奥巴马(Barack Obama)政府采取的果敢行动，美国经济才如此迅速地恢复了生机。

Everyone has benefited greatly from this success.

所有人都极大地受益于此次成功。

Nevertheless, the crisis has left deep scars.

然而，这场危机还是留下了严重的后遗症。

In the second quarter of 2016, real GDP per head was still only 4 per cent above its pre-crisis peak, almost nine years before.

2016年第二季度的实际人均GDP仍只比危机前（将近9年前）的峰值水平高4%。

Labour productivity has grown slowly since the crisis, by historical standards, largely as a result of weakened investment.

以历史标准衡量，劳动生产率自上次危机发生以来一直增长缓慢——主要是由投资减弱造成。

One study estimates US potential output is 7 per cent below levels suggested by pre-crisis trends.

一项研究估计，美国的潜在产出比危机前的趋势水平低了7%。

Yet average growth of US labour productivity, albeit⁷ slowly subsiding⁸, has exceeded that of other leading high-income economies over the past 15 years.

但尽管出现放缓，过去15年间，美国劳动生产率的平均增速超过了其他主要高收入经济体。

This is probably due to its dominance of high-tech⁹ innovation: the aggregate¹⁰ capitalisation of the five largest US technology companies is now over $2.2tn.

这多半得益于美国在高科技创新领域的主导地位：美国最大的5家科技公司现在的总市值已经超过2.2万亿美元。

Yet, the scars left by the crisis, which include diminished confidence in the probity¹¹ and competence¹² of the financial, intellectual and policymaking elites¹³, also came on top of older ones.

然而，上次危机留下的后遗症——其中包括对金融界、知识界及政策制定界精英的诚信和能力的日渐不信任——也是紧随着一些老问题出现的。

Real median household income increased by 5.2 per cent between 2014 and 2015.

2014年至2015年间，美国家庭实际收入中值提高了5.2%.

But it remains¹⁴ below pre-crisis levels.

但仍低于危机前的水平。

Indeed, it is below levels reached in 2000 and has even fallen relative to real GDP per head consistently since the mid 1970s.

实际上，这一中值也低于2000年水平，甚至相对于自上世纪70年代中期以来的实际人均GDP都一直在下降。

This performance helps explain the tide of disillusionment, even despair, revealed so starkly¹⁵ by this grim election (see charts).

这一表现可以解释普遍的幻灭感，甚至绝望感——在此次气氛严肃的大选中显露无遗 。

Not surprisingly, inequality has worsened markedly.

意料之中的是，美国的不平等已明显恶化。

Between 1980 and the most recent period, the share of the top 1 per cent in pre-tax income jumped from 10 per cent to 18 per cent.

从1980年直至最近时期，税前收入前1%人口所占收入比例已从10%跃升至18%。

Even after tax, it rose by a third, from 8 to 12 per cent.

即使是税后，他们所占收入比例也增加了三分之一，从8%增至12%。

The rise in compensation of chief executives, relative to that of workers, has been huge.

相对于普通员工，首席执行官们的薪酬涨幅一直很高。

The US has the highest inequality of any high-income country and has seen the fastest rise in inequality among the seven leading high-income economies.

在所有高收入国家中，美国的不平等程度最高，而在7个收入最高的经济体中，美国不平等程度加剧的速度最快。

The divergence¹⁶ among these countries suggests that rising inequality is far more a social choice than an economic imperative¹⁷.

这些国家之间的差异表明，不平等程度日益加剧更多的是一个社会选择问题，而非在经济上不可避免。

Closely related to the rising inequality has been a decline in the share of labour in GDP from 64.6 per cent in 2001 to 60.4 per cent in 2014.

与日益加剧的不平等密切相关的是，劳动力在GDP中所占份额从2001年的64.6%下降到2014年的60.4%。

Workers have not only suffered from declining shares of the pie.

劳动者遭遇的不仅是分到的蛋糕越来越小。

Just as significant is the steady rise in the proportion of men aged 25 to 54 neither in work nor seeking it from about 3 per cent in the 1950s to 12 per cent now.

同样显著的遭遇还有，25岁至54岁男性中没有工作且已放弃求职的比例稳步上升，从20世纪50年代的3%上升到现在的12%。

Even France had a higher fraction of prime-age men in jobs than the US every year since 2001.

就连法国的壮年男性占就业人口比例自2001年以来都年年压过美国。

Since 1990, the US has had the second-largest increase in male non-participation in the labour force of all members of the Organisation¹⁸ for Economic Co-operation and Development.

自1990年起，美国男性未参与劳动的比率的增幅在经合组织(OECD)所有成员国里排第二。

After 2000, the declining trend in non-participation of prime-age women also halted.

2000年以后，壮年女性未参与劳动的比率不断下降的趋势也停止了。

The proportion of US women in this age category in employment is now among the lowest of all the members of the OECD.

美国女性在所有壮年就业人口中所占比例现在也属经合组织所有成员中最低之列。

No less disturbing is a decline in economic dynamism.

经济活力的下降也同样令人不安。

The rate of creation of new jobs has slowed markedly, as have rates of internal migration¹⁹.

就业岗位新增速度显著放缓，国内人口迁移率也是一样。

The rate of entry of new businesses into the marketplace has also been falling over an extended period, as has the share of ones less than five years old in both the total number of businesses and employment.

新企业进入市场的速度也已持续下降较长一段时期，成立不足5年的企业在所有企业中所占比例以及在总就业中所占比例也是一样。

Meanwhile, business fixed²⁰ investment has been persistently²¹ weak.

与此同时，企业固定投资持续疲软。

Evidence also suggests a rising variation in returns on capital.

证据还显示资本回报的差异日益加大。

These are long-term trends, not just post-crisis events.

这些都是长期趋势，不仅仅是危机后事件。

This loss of dynamism may not only be related to declining productivity growth but also to the shifts in income distribution.

经济活力丧失可能不止与生产率增长减弱有关，还与收入分配的变化有关。

If competitive pressure is falling, monopolistic and monopsonistic — sole-buyer — positions will either emerge or strengthen.

如果竞争压力在下降，垄断和独买（买方垄断）的格局要么会出现、要么会巩固。

The collapse²² of trade unionism and decline in relative minimum wages reinforce the asymmetric²³ power of business and labour in the marketplace.

工会的崩溃，以及相对最低工资的下降加强了企业和劳动力在市场中的力量不对称。

Intellectual property rights can also be a big barrier to competition.

知识产权也可能成为阻碍竞争的一大因素。

The rise of new regulatory barriers is disturbing.

新监管壁垒的兴起令人不安。

Among the striking changes is the soaring share of workers with an occupational licence at state level.

还有一个显著变化是拥有州级职业许可证的劳动者所占比例出现飙升。

These licences must be a big obstacle to easy movement across state borders.

这些许可证肯定极大地阻碍劳动者方便地跨州流动。

For all its strengths, the US economy could do better.

尽管美国经济拥有种种优势，它本还可以表现得更好。

In addition to the trends identified above, deteriorating²⁴ infrastructure²⁵, worsening relative educational performance and a terrible tax code are challenges.

除上述趋势以外，基础设施的退化，教育相对表现的恶化，以及糟糕的税制都构成挑战。

Halting immigrants and imports would be an act of self-harm.

停止接纳移民和进口将是自损之举。

The US must build on its historic strengths of an open and dynamic economy, together with government provision of infrastructure, research, education, and balanced tax and regulatory policies.

美国必须发扬其一贯的优势，即一个开放、有活力的经济，再加上政府提供的基础设施、研究、教育，以及均衡的税收和监管政策。

A new administration needs the right diagnosis²⁶ and co-operation from Congress.

新政府需要正确的判断以及国会的合作。

Pigs may also fly.

猪或许也可以飞起来。