To watch the confrontation1 between the US’s most valuable company and its top law enforcement agency is to find oneself in a state of nearly permanent cognitive2 dissonance.
观察一下美国最有价值的公司与美国最高执法机构之间的对峙,你会陷入一种近乎永久性“认知失调”的状态中。
Apparently3, America’s government agencies are both omnipotent4 and helpless. Omnipotent because, as this week’s batch5 of surveillance revelations from WikiLeaks suggests, they have no problems intercepting6 highly secretive communications between their European allies. Helpless because, as the Federal Bureau of Investigation7’s bosses keep repeating, they need Apple’s co-operation in order to break into the iPhone of the shooter in the San Bernardino attacks.
显然,美国政府机构既无所不能,又很无助。之所以说无所不能是因为,正如上周维基解密(WikiLeaks)爆料的数起监控案例所表明的那样,它们在拦截欧洲盟友之间高度机密的通信内容方面神通广大。之所以说无助是因为,正如联邦调查局(FBI)的头头们屡次重申的那样,它们需要苹果(Apple)的合作,以解锁圣贝纳迪诺枪击案凶手的iPhone。
It gets worse. On February 9, James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, boasted in his Senate testimony8 that “in the future, intelligence services might use the [internet of things] for identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials9.” Now we learn that such agencies cannot get into our smartphones … let alone our smart fridges.
更糟的还在后面。今年2月9日,美国国家情报总监(DNI)詹姆斯克拉珀(James Clapper)在参议院作证时夸耀称,“未来,情报部门可能使用(物联网)来确认、监听、监控、定位以及定向招募,或者进入网络或者用户凭据”。现在我们知道,这些机构无法进入我们的智能手机……更别说我们的智能冰箱了。
Something in the government’s rhetoric10 does not add up. The FBI either has solid reasons to break into that phone — in which case it is not obvious why the mighty11 power of the National Security Agency and other government bodies has not yet been mobilised — or it is simply using the San Bernardino case as an excuse to redefine its relationship with Silicon12 Valley.
美国政府的某些言论并不能自圆其说。FBI要么有解锁那部手机的充足理由——如果是这种情况的话,美国国家安全局(NSA)和其他政府机构的强大能力不知为何没有被动用——要么只是以圣贝纳迪诺枪击案为借口来重新界定它与硅谷的关系。
Asked by a judge about its willingness to enlist13 the help of all the federal agencies in a similar case from 2015, the government responded that “federal prosecutors14 don’t have an obligation to consult the intelligence community in order to investigate crime.”
在2015年的一起类似案件中,当被一名法官问及是否愿意争取所有联邦机构的帮助时,美国政府回应称,“联邦检察机关没有咨询情报部门以调查犯罪行为的义务”。
And since very little is known about the true capabilities15 of America’s intelligence community, everyone involved in the current debate has to pretend that the world’s most powerful spying agency does not exist.
既然人们对美国情报机关的真实能力知之甚少,所有卷入当前辩论的人不得不假装,这个全球最强大的情报机构并不存在。
While the FBI’s defence has been that their request is extremely narrow — once Apple has facilitated access to that single phone, it is free to destroy the code required to do so — the broader political context in which this battle unfolds suggests that Apple’s stance will have far-reaching implications.
尽管FBI一直辩称,他们的要求极低——一旦苹果帮助解锁了那部手机,就可以销毁为此开发的代码——但这场争斗所处的更广泛的政治环境表明,苹果的立场将具有深远的影响。
First, the FBI’s request comes at a time when the US government is exerting immense pressure on America’s largest technology companies to join it in the fight against Isis. Both the state department and the Department of Defense16 have recently expanded their presence in Silicon Valley.
首先,FBI提出请求之际,正值美国政府对美国大型科技公司施加巨大压力,要求它们加入到打击“伊斯兰国”(ISIS)中。FBI和美国国防部最近都扩大了在硅谷的存在。
While many such requests are straightforward17 — removing jihadist propaganda from YouTube or Twitter, for example — there are concerns that such pressure might extend to modifying their algorithms in order to hide certain types of content from easily susceptible18 users.
尽管许多此类要求很直接——例如,消除YouTube或Twitter上的圣战宣传标语——但仍有人担心,此类压力可能延展至要求科技公司调整算法,以便向容易受影响的用户屏蔽某些类型的内容。
Google knows what is in your inbox; why should it not modify your search results to make you less of a terrorist?
谷歌(Google)知道你的收件箱里有什么;它为何不应调整你的搜索结果以便降低你发展成恐怖分子的可能性?
Second, it is hard to believe that the San Bernardino case will be an isolated19 episode. Not only are there several similar cases already pending20 in US courts but many prosecutors have already indicated they have their own backlog21 of phones to unlock.
其次,很难相信圣贝纳迪诺枪击案会是一个孤立事件。美国法院已有多起类似的案件等待判决,而且很多检察官已表示,他们也有大量手机等待解锁。
Manhattan district attorney Cyrus Vance said recently that he would “absolutely ... want access to all those phones that are crucial in a criminal investigation.”
曼哈顿地区检察官塞勒斯万斯(Cyrus Vance)最近表示,他“肯定……希望破解所有在刑事调查中起关键作用的手机。”
Even if Apple chose to destroy the code it writes to help the FBI on this occasion, it would need to rewrite it for a new request. Should it keep this code forever, it would be holding on to a magic key to its devices — a highly prized asset for any hacker22.
即便苹果选择销毁这次为帮助FBI而编写的代码,以后再有新的要求时它还得重写。如果苹果永远保留这个代码,这将为其设备保有一把带有魔力的钥匙:这对于任何黑客而言都是一项十足珍贵的资产。
Given the publicity23 of the case, any terrorists would probably stop using Apple’s products anyway. The only people to suffer would be ordinary users, stuck with their iPhones and iPads.
鉴于此案的曝光度,所有恐怖主义分子恐怕都不会再用苹果产品。唯一的受害者将是那些离不开iPhone和iPad的普通用户。
Third, the FBI’s rationale in this case would make any other manufacturer of smart devices — including all those smart fridges and smart thermostats24 in your smart home — subject to similar requests.
第三,联邦调查局在此案中提出的理由将令所有其他生产智能设备的制造商(包括你的智能家居中的智能冰箱和智能恒温器)服从类似的要求。
If Apple can be forced to modify security protocols25 on its phone, what stops the FBI from asking the manufacturer of the smart smoke detector26 to trigger a fake smoke alarm? Or asking the manufacturer of the smart car to drive suspects directly to the police station?
如果苹果可以被迫修改其手机的安全协议,那么还有什么能阻止FBI要求智能烟雾报警器制造商发出虚假烟雾报警?或者要求生产智能汽车的制造商让嫌疑人乘坐的汽车直接开到警察局?
All of this would seem neat so long as the government agencies were competent and nobody else could take advantage of such vulnerabilities.
所有这些似乎都会安然无事,只要政府机构有能力,而且其他人无法利用这些脆弱性。
This is not so. The San Bernardino case — where the FBI had a chance to break into the phone but blew it by changing the suspect’s Apple password — suggests that the FBI’s technical competence27 does not yet match the NSA’s.
但情况并非如此,在圣贝纳迪诺枪击案中,联邦调查局曾经有机会破解那部手机,但在修改嫌疑人的苹果密码时搞砸了。这表明,联邦调查局的技术能力还赶不上美国国家安全局。
And it would be suicidal to force technology companies to weaken security at a time when institutions of all sorts are vulnerable to hackers28 demanding ransoms29 — earlier this month, a hospital in California paid the bitcoin equivalent of $17,000 to hackers who had breached30 its computer network.
在各类机构容易受到索要赎金的黑客的攻击之际,迫使科技公司削弱产品的安全性无异于自杀。本月早些时候,加州一家医院向攻击其电脑网络的黑客支付了价值相当于1.7万美元的比特币。
Apple’s proposed solution is the right one: America needs a comprehensive political debate on the issue — one that would bypass inter-agency squabbling.
苹果提出的解决方案是正确的:美国需要就这个问题展开一场全面的政治辩论,这场辩论将绕开机构之间的争吵。
Alas, given how little the current batch of presidential candidates seems to care, or even understand, these issues, this debate is not likely to happen.
唉,当前的各位总统候选人似乎都不太关心这些问题,甚至不太了解,因此这场辩论不太可能出现。
1 confrontation [ˌkɒnfrʌnˈteɪʃn] 第9级 | |
n.对抗,对峙,冲突 | |
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2 cognitive [ˈkɒgnətɪv] 第7级 | |
adj.认知的,认识的,有感知的 | |
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3 apparently [əˈpærəntli] 第7级 | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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4 omnipotent [ɒmˈnɪpətənt] 第10级 | |
adj.全能的,万能的 | |
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5 batch [bætʃ] 第7级 | |
n.一批(组,群);一批生产量 | |
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6 intercepting [ɪntə'septɪŋ] 第8级 | |
截取(技术),截接 | |
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7 investigation [ɪnˌvestɪˈgeɪʃn] 第7级 | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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8 testimony [ˈtestɪməni] 第7级 | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
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9 credentials [krəˈdenʃlz] 第8级 | |
n.证明,资格,证明书,证件 | |
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10 rhetoric [ˈretərɪk] 第8级 | |
n.修辞学,浮夸之言语 | |
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11 mighty [ˈmaɪti] 第7级 | |
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12 silicon [ˈsɪlɪkən] 第7级 | |
n.硅(旧名矽) | |
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13 enlist [ɪnˈlɪst] 第9级 | |
vt.谋取(支持等),赢得;征募;vi.入伍 | |
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14 prosecutors [p'rɒsɪkju:təz] 第10级 | |
检举人( prosecutor的名词复数 ); 告发人; 起诉人; 公诉人 | |
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15 capabilities [ˌkeɪpəˈbɪlɪti:z] 第7级 | |
n.能力( capability的名词复数 );可能;容量;[复数]潜在能力 | |
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16 defense [dɪ'fens] 第7级 | |
n.防御,保卫;[pl.]防务工事;辩护,答辩 | |
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17 straightforward [ˌstreɪtˈfɔ:wəd] 第7级 | |
adj.正直的,坦率的;易懂的,简单的 | |
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18 susceptible [səˈseptəbl] 第7级 | |
adj.过敏的,敏感的;易动感情的,易受感动的 | |
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19 isolated ['aisəleitid] 第7级 | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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20 pending [ˈpendɪŋ] 第9级 | |
prep.直到,等待…期间;adj.待定的;迫近的 | |
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21 backlog [ˈbæklɒg] 第10级 | |
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22 hacker [ˈhækə(r)] 第9级 | |
n.能盗用或偷改电脑中信息的人,电脑黑客 | |
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23 publicity [pʌbˈlɪsəti] 第7级 | |
n.众所周知,闻名;宣传,广告 | |
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24 thermostats [ˈθɜ:məˌstæts] 第10级 | |
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25 protocols [p'rəʊtəkɒlz] 第8级 | |
n.礼仪( protocol的名词复数 );(外交条约的)草案;(数据传递的)协议;科学实验报告(或计划) | |
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26 detector [dɪˈtektə(r)] 第7级 | |
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27 competence [ˈkɒmpɪtəns] 第7级 | |
n.能力,胜任,称职 | |
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28 hackers ['hækərz] 第9级 | |
n.计算机迷( hacker的名词复数 );私自存取或篡改电脑资料者,电脑“黑客” | |
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