The Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) builds on China’s long-standing economic investment in Central Asia, and it has the potential to further develop Central Asian economies. However, China’s historical track record of investment engagement in the region raises concerns that the SREB could instead exacerbate¹ economic inequalities and poor governance.

建立在中国对中亚地区长期经济投资基础上的“丝绸之路经济带”(Silk Road Economic Belt)，有进一步推动中亚各国经济发展的潜力。然而，中国参与该地区投资的历史却引发担忧——丝绸之路经济带反而可能加剧这里的经济分化及治理不善。

China has long been a key driver of infrastructure² investment and construction in Central Asia, covering a wide range of sectors³. It has invested heavily in the region’s natural resource extraction, with gas, oil, uranium, gold and copper⁴ making up key exports from the region.

中国长期以来一直是中亚地区许多行业基础设施投资和建设的关键动力。它大量投资于中亚地区的自然资源开采，使得天然气、石油、铀、黄金及铜成为该地区的主要出口产品。

However,China has done far more than just invest in extractives. Chinese companies have built roads, railways, tunnels, power lines and refurbished oil refineries⁵ as well as special economic zones. It is also actively⁶ involved in agri-business and telecommunications investments.

然而，中国所做的远不止于投资资源开采。中国企业在中亚修建了公路、铁路、隧道、输电线路，改造了炼油厂并建设了经济特区。中国还积极参与当地农业企业及电信投资。

China’s economic strategy for Central Asia is linked to the domestic agenda for Xinjiang, the northwest frontier region that is home to a sizable Muslim ethnic⁷ minority population. This is based on the assumption that building up economic prosperity will result in political stability. For this theory to be truly tested, China needs to ensure the economic benefits cascade⁸ down to the general populations of Central Asia.

中国对中亚的经济战略与国内对新疆的规划密切相关，地处中国西北边境的新疆聚居着大量穆斯林少数民族人口。这项规划基于的假设是，打造经济繁荣将带来政治稳定。要让这一理论真正经受住考验，中国需要确保经济利益能够向下惠及中亚地区的广大民众。

But so far the SREB initiative does not articulate how this trickle⁹ down effect is supposed to take place.

但到目前为止，丝绸之路经济带倡议并未清楚地说明这种涓滴效应该如何实现。

For example, Chinese investment should in theory open up employment opportunities for the local populations. But there are limitations to this. Most often, a condition of the huge soft loans that China provides through state banks is that the linked projects are implemented¹⁰ by a Chinese company and workforce¹¹.

例如，理论上，中国的投资应该可以扩大当地居民的就业机会。但这方面受到了限制。很多时候，中国通过政策性银行提供巨额软贷款的条件之一是，相关项目要由中国企业及中国劳动力来实施。

Although not a Chinese-specific funding method, it has contributed to some resentment¹² amongst Central Asian populations against Chinese investment. Certain countries, such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have guarded against this with local content quotas¹³. Turkmenistan technically¹⁴ requires that a project’s workforce consists of 70 per cent local employees, and Uzbekistan mandates¹⁵ that Chinese companies can only send management personnel, not labourers. In reality, there are lapses¹⁶ in adherence¹⁷ to such stipulations.

虽然这并非中国特有的融资方式，但这样做已经引发了部分中亚民众对中国投资的不满。土库曼斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦等国已经在利用“当地含量要求”抵制上述条件。在技术上，土库曼斯坦要求一个项目70%的劳动力要来自当地，而乌兹别克斯坦要求中国企业只能委派管理人员，不能使用中国工人。但在现实中，并未严格遵照此类规定。

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there is a more visible Chinese workforce. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the construction of two roads (Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam and Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart) part-funded by China consisted of 30 per cent local workers versus¹⁸ 70 per cent Chinese workers, with 60 per cent of raw materials imported. This highlights the often China-centric relationship that is quite typical on such infrastructure projects.

在吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦，可以看到更多的中国劳动力大军。例如，在吉尔吉斯斯坦，在由中国提供部分资金的奥什-萨雷塔什-伊尔克什坦(Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam)公路、比什凯克-纳伦-吐尔尕特(Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart)公路的建设中，当地工人占了30%，中国工人占了70%，其中60%的原材料为进口。这凸显出，这种通常以中国为中心的国家关系在这些基础设施项目中相当典型。

A lack of clarity in the terms of official lending to Central Asia may also increase economic vulnerabilities in the region, especially given the weight of Beijing’s loans in the national balance sheet. For instance, the Export-Import Bank of China was Kyrgyzstan’s largest creditor¹⁹ at the end of 2015, with outstanding credit worth almost $1.3bn out of a total $3.6bn in external debt.

中国提供给中亚的官方贷款的条款缺乏透明度，也可能加剧该地区的经济脆弱性，特别是考虑到北京方面的贷款在接受贷款国家资产负债表中的比重。例如，2015年底，中国进出口银行(Export-Import Bank of China)是吉尔吉斯斯坦最大的债权人，该国总外债36亿美元，其中中国进出口银行的贷款余额近13亿美元。

A representative at the International Monetary²⁰ Fund (IMF) in Dushanbe noted²¹ that the organisation²² was encouraging Tajikistan to accept the loans, given the very low interest rate. Despite these good terms, in reality the loans are offered with quiet scepticism that they will ever be paid back. This is particularly true of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, given their heavier dependence²³ on Chinese aid. A Wikileaks report from 2009 highlighted this scepticism, saying ‘no one in either the Chinese or Tajik governments is speaking about paying back Chinese loans’.

国际货币基金组织(IMF)驻杜尚别的一名代表指出，鉴于利率非常低，该组织鼓励塔吉克斯坦接受这些贷款。尽管有这些优惠条件，实际上，这些贷款在发放的时候即隐含一个怀疑——它们最终是否能得到偿还。对吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦而言尤其如此，因为它们更为依赖中国的援助。2009年曝光的一份维基解密(Wikileaks)报告突出了这种怀疑，该报告称，“中国政府和塔吉克斯坦政府中都没有人提及偿还中国贷款之事”。

But the Chinese may seek loan repayments²⁵ in other ways. Sometimes deals are structured so that access to resources or mineral rights become part of the repayment²⁴ plan. However, there are suspicions of other, less transparent²⁶ agreements, such as Tajikistan’s 2011 agreement to settle a land demarcation issue with China, in which the latter gained 1,000 sq km. This has been described as an ‘unofficial debt writing-off agreement’, although there is no documentary evidence of such deals. Mounting debt exposure within already structurally²⁷ vulnerable economies could exacerbate domestic inequalities and potentially encourage unfair practices.

但中国或许会通过其他方式寻求收回贷款。有时，一些协议的签署是为了让中方获得资源或矿产权成为还款计划的一部分。然而，人们怀疑还有其他较不透明的协议。例如，2011年，塔吉克斯坦与中国达成了一项解决领土划界问题的协议，中国从中获得了1000平方公里土地。此举被形容为一项“非正式债务勾销协议”，尽管没有关于此类交易的书面证据。在这些经济结构早已处于脆弱状态的国家，不断扩大的债务敞口或将加剧国内贫富分化，还可能鼓励不公平竞争行为。

In addition, there has been criticism of Chinese companies engaging in non-transparent operations in the region. Although far from the only foreign entity²⁸ to be accused of opacity²⁹ in Central Asia, a case involving Chinese state-owned oil and gas company CNPC is prominent.

此外，还有对中国企业在该地区参与非透明运作的批评。一起涉及中国国有油气公司中国石油天然气集团公司(CNPC)的事件引起巨大关注，虽然在中亚，该公司远非被指责不透明的唯一外国实体。

In 2003 CNPC acquired a 25 per cent stake in Kazakhstan’s Aktobemunaigas, a Kazakh oil and gas company. There is documentary evidence to suggest that, through a complex set of business transactions involving a group of offshore³⁰ entities³¹, this sale involved a repurchase scheme of shares in Aktobemunaigas from a company controlled by a former business associate of the Kazakh president’s son-in-law. Questions surround opaque³² dealings through companies registered in the British Virgin³³ Islands (BVI) in relation to the acquisition, but Kazakh authorities have banned reports on the topic. No action has been brought by Kazakhstan’s authorities against any party in the deal.

2003年，中国石油天然气集团公司收购了一家名为Aktobemunaigas的哈萨克斯坦石油天然气公司25%的股份。有书面证据表明，通过涉及多家离岸实体的一系列复杂的商业交易，此番股权出售包含了一项股份回购计划，从哈萨克斯坦总统女婿的前商业伙伴控制的一家公司回购Aktobemunaigas的股份。通过在英属维尔京群岛(BVI)注册的公司进行的、与此次收购相关的不透明交易引发质疑，但哈萨克斯坦政府已下令查禁该话题的报道。哈萨克斯坦当局并未对交易中的任何一方采取措施。

There have also been instances of opacity in infrastructure built by Chinese companies. The state-owned China Road and Bridge Corporation, funded through an Ex-Im Bank loan, upgraded the Dushanbe-Khujand-Chanak road in Tajikistan. In April 2010 the BVI-registered Innovative³⁴ Road Solutions Ltd, a company with no apparent track record in such projects, implemented toll³⁵ booths on this road as part of the government’s strategy to raise funds to repay the Chinese loan.

还有其他关于中国企业承建基础设施不透明的事例。在中国进出口银行贷款的资助下，国有的中国路桥公司(China Road and Bridge Corporation)在塔吉克斯坦承接了杜尚别-苦盏-恰诺克(Dushanbe-Khujand-Chanak)公路升级项目。2010年4月，在英属维尔京群岛注册的Innovative Road Solutions Ltd公司（一家没有参与此类项目的明显记录的公司）在该公路上设立了收费站，作为政府筹集资金、偿还中国贷款的方案的一部分。

China’s SREB vision could be transformative for Central Asia. Investment is by no means altruistic³⁶, but China’s vision does in theory support an economic agenda that enhances prosperity for local populations. China has emphasised the importance of good governance through SREB initiatives such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

对中亚地区而言，中国丝绸之路经济带愿景可能带来变革。投资当然不可能是无私的，但中国的愿景在理论上的确可以支持为当地居民提升繁荣水平的经济议程。中国一直强调通过丝绸之路经济带倡议——如亚洲基础设施投资银行(AIIB)——进行善治的重要性。

It also intends for the AIIB to partner more with development banks such as the Asian Development Bank, which will require adherence to an open tendering process that may address some of the issues of transparency. However, there are risks that if historical practices of bilateral³⁷ engagement continue in Central Asia, the SREB initiative may be seen less than transformative for the local populations of Central Asia.

中国还计划让亚投行更多地与亚洲开发银行(Asian Development Bank)等开发银行进行合作，这将要求中国遵守公开招标流程，这样或许可以解决部分透明度问题。然而，如果还跟以前一样继续进行双边交易，那对中亚地区的居民而言，丝绸之路经济带倡议可能不会带来多大变革。