In August, subsidiaries of several western companies — Eon, Engie, OMV, Shell and Wintershall — decided¹ not to participate in Gazprom’s Nord Stream 2.

今年8月，几家西方公司（Eon、Engie、OMV、壳牌(Shell)和德国温特沙尔公司(Wintershall)）的子公司决定不参与俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司(Gazprom)的北溪-2 (Nord Stream 2)项目。

The consortium, led by the Russian state-owned gas monopoly, was established to design, finance, build and operate two additional strings² of the undersea gas pipeline³ between Russia and Germany.

由这家俄罗斯国有天然气寡头牵头的这个财团的设立，是为了俄罗斯与德国之间两条新的海底天然气管道的设计、融资、建设和运营。

The companies also withdrew their application for merger⁴ approval, submitted to the Polish competition protection authority in December.

这些公司还撤回了合并审批申请，该申请于去年12月递交至波兰竞争保护部门。

In the view of the Polish government, such a step showed that they had no counter-arguments to the regulator’s concerns about the likely effect of the project on competition in the Polish and EU gas markets.

在波兰政府看来，这种行为表明，对于该监管机构就该项目对波兰和欧盟天然气市场竞争可能造成的影响的担忧，他们没有反驳意见。

Together with eight other EU member states (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia), and with the tacit support of a couple of others, Poland has opposed Nord Stream 2 since it was first announced by Gazprom in 2015.

自从俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司于2015年首次宣布北溪-2项目以来，在一些国家的默许支持下，波兰与其他8个欧盟成员国（捷克、爱沙尼亚、克罗地亚、匈牙利、立陶宛、拉脱维亚、罗马尼亚和斯洛伐克）一道反对该项目。

It undermines European solidarity⁵ and the Energy Union, the EU’s flagship project.

它破坏了欧洲的团结和欧盟的旗舰项目能源联盟(Energy Union)。

The economic arguments for Nord Stream 2 were always questionable⁶, especially considering overcapacity on existing supply transit⁷ routes from Russia to the EU.

支持北溪-2项目的经济理由一直令人质疑，特别是考虑到目前从俄罗斯到欧盟的供应运输线路已运力过剩。

And given Europe’s considerable dependence⁸ on Russian gas and the damage the project would cause to the Ukrainian economy (which is subsidised by the EU), the political motivations behind it seemed obvious.

鉴于欧洲对俄罗斯天然气的严重依赖以及该项目可能给乌克兰经济（由欧盟提供补贴）带来的损害，其背后的政治动机似乎显而易见。

With the withdrawal⁹ of the western companies, the case against Nord Stream 2 looks even more powerful.

在西方公司退出后，反对北溪-2项目的理由看上去更为充分。

A project that previously¹⁰ appeared merely controversial now looks like a Trojan horse capable of destabilising the economy and poisoning political relations inside the EU.

这个以前看上去只是具有争议的项目，现在看来就像一匹特洛伊木马，可能会造成经济不稳定并毒害欧盟内部的政治关系。

EU institutions that should make the core principles and unity¹¹ of the bloc¹² their priority have not taken a firm stand on Nord Stream 2.

应当把欧盟核心原则及团结作为优先考虑的欧盟机构，在北溪-2项目上没有采取坚定立场。

And suggestions from Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, that a legal solution could be found have yet to amount to anything.

欧盟委员会(European Commission)主席让-克洛德.容克(Jean-Claude Juncker)认为，可以找到合法解决方案，但目前什么结果都没有。

This ambiguous position is difficult to explain, especially when one considers, on the one hand, the EU sanctions against Russia imposed after the illegal annexation¹³ of Crimea and, on the other, the fact that Gazprom is owned by the Russian state.

欧盟这种模糊的立场很难解释，特别是考虑到一方面欧盟在俄罗斯非法吞并克里米亚之后对其实施了制裁，另一方面俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司由俄罗斯政府所有。

By supporting Nord Stream 2, the EU in effect gives succour to a regime whose aggression¹⁴ it seeks to punish through sanctions.

通过支持北溪-2项目，欧盟实际上是在帮助这个它希望通过制裁惩罚其侵略行为的政权。

This contradiction is unsustainable.

这种矛盾是不可持续的。

The EU cannot continue to offer financial support to Ukraine, maintain sanctions against Russia and call for a resilient energy union while at the same time collaborating¹⁵ on Nord Stream 2 with Gazprom.

欧盟不可能一边向乌克兰提供财力支持、继续对俄罗斯实施制裁，并呼吁建立一个抗打击的能源联盟，一边继续与俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司在北溪-2项目上展开合作。

This is why Poland and other central and eastern European member states have called on the commission to act as a guardian¹⁶ of EU treaties and to demand that Nord Stream 2, including its offshore¹⁷ sections, conform in full with EU law.

这就是为什么波兰和其他中东欧成员国一直呼吁，欧盟委员会成为欧盟条约的守护者并要求北溪-2项目（包括其海底区段）全面符合欧盟法律。

The commission should also guarantee that the most vulnerable member states are protected from an external monopoly seeking to apply political pressure on them.

欧盟委员会还应保证，最脆弱的欧盟成员国不受谋求对其施加政治压力的外部垄断者的压迫。

It has the power, if not to freeze the project completely, then at least to limit its disruptive impact on the European gas market and on the security of supply policies.

它至少有权力限制其对欧洲天然气市场以及供应安全政策的破坏性影响，如果不是彻底冻结该项目的话。

Nord Stream 2 is a test of European unity and of the credibility of EU institutions.

北溪-2项目是对欧洲团结以及欧盟机构可信性的考验。

Poland is determined¹⁸ to defend the bloc’s fundamental principles, even if that might mean appealing to the Court of Justice of the EU.

波兰决定维护欧盟的基本原则，即便这可能意味着向欧洲法院(Court of Justice)上诉。

Support for the project by any member state or a passive approach by the commission that results in preferential treatment being given to Nord Stream 2 — for instance, exemption¹⁹ from the market rules enshrined in the so-called third package of legislation — may be subject to legal challenge by Poland or other countries, in the court if need be.

任何一个欧盟成员国支持该项目，或者欧盟委员会采取被动策略导致向北溪-2项目提供优惠待遇（例如可不遵守关于能源市场的所谓第三套立法(third package of legislation)规定的市场规则），都可能受到波兰或其他国家的法律挑战，如果需要可能对簿公堂。

If EU institutions are unclear as to the scope of their competences²⁰, Poland and its partners are ready to provide clarity in the courts.

如果欧盟机构对其职权范围含糊不清的话，那么波兰及其伙伴准备赴法庭明确。

Promoting the economic interests of certain countries at the expense of the security and stability of others is no way for the EU to escape the crisis it finds itself in.

以一些国家的安全和稳定为代价推动另一些国家的经济利益，绝非欧盟摆脱所处危机之道。

Nor is it likely to imbue²¹ disillusioned²² citizens with renewed faith in European institutions.

这也不可能让大失所望的公民重拾对欧盟机构的信心。

Doing that requires abandoning the pursuit of short-term individual gain in the interests of the EU as a whole.

要做到这一点，需要根据整个欧盟的利益放弃对短期个体好处的追求。

The Nord Stream 2 affair should not be allowed to stand as an example of the EU turning a blind eye.

不应任由北溪-2项目事件成为一个欧盟故意失明的例子。

We should instead be able to hold it up as proof that the EU will act when needed to defend the rules on which it was founded.

相反，这一事件应该成为一项证据，表明欧盟将在需要维护其所基于的规则时采取行动。