As 2014 drew to a close, I became one of the last baby boomers to turn 50. Or possibly, I became one of the first Generation Xers to reach that milestone¹. Depending where you draw the line, either I am about to enjoy the fruits of half a century of increasing affluence² and entitlement, having climbed to the top of the hierarchy³ I help sustain; or I am entering a period of resentment⁴ about my smug elders’ lockhold on the best jobs and homes and the damage they have inflicted⁵ on the environment and humankind.

到2014年年底，我成为了婴儿潮一代中最后一批步入50岁的人。或者说，我成为了X一代(Generation X)中首批到达50岁的人。根据不同的分界线，我或者是作为维持社会阶层结构并爬上了顶端的人，即将享受半个世纪以来日益增长的财富和福利的果实；或者是，对自命不凡的长者牢牢占据了最好的工作和房子、并对环境和人类造成损害，我开始步入一段愤怒的时期。

I am part of Generation Cusp. Businesses that treat me as a boomer will vex⁶ me with advertisements for products intended for grumpy pensioners⁷ (the oldest members of the postwar birth bulge⁸ are now in their late 60s), while those that market to me as a Gen Xer will annoy me by assuming I have something in common with overambitious 30-somethings.

我是处于交叉点的一代。把我视为婴儿潮一代的企业，会用针对脾气暴躁的退休老人的产品广告来烦我（战后出生率暴涨时期出生的人中年纪最大的一些人，现在将近70岁），同样让我恼火的是，那些把我当作X一代的企业则假设我和那些过于雄心勃勃的30来岁的人有一些共同之处。

Such generational generalisations are only the crudest way companies decide what to sell and how to sell it. But much as I hate the stereotyping⁹, there are good reasons why this will not be the year the personalised product and the personalised pitch come of age.

这种对一代人的泛化不过是企业决定销售什么产品、以及用何种方式销售产品的最粗略的方式。尽管我很讨厌这种模式化，但仍有一些很强的原因，解释我们为何今年还不会迎来个性化产品和个性化销售策略的时代。

Experts have long heralded¹⁰ the ability of manufacturers to use “mass customisation” to pimp my training shoes or your car. Insurers are eager to tailor their products to my personal driving habits. Personalised diagnostic tools and drug therapies —linked to patients’ DNA¹¹ sequences — are on the horizon. With scant¹² regard for our own privacy, we are already volunteering enough information to companies to allow them to launch more precise attacks on our wallets.

专家们早就预言制造商将有能力用“大规模定制”向我推销训练鞋，或者向你推销汽车。保险公司迫切地希望根据我的驾驶习惯量身打造产品。与病人的DNA序列相关联的个性化诊断工具和药物疗法在未来也可能出现。我们对自身隐私考虑甚少，已经自愿把足够的信息提供给企业，让他们对我们的钱包发起更精准的攻击。

But the promise of personalisation has faded a bit since Chris Anderson got marketers all excited nine years ago with The Long Tail . In the book, he outlined the potential profit lurking¹³ in low-volume items at the end of the demand curve and warned that the 80/20 rule — the crude assumption that 20 per cent of products account for 80 per cent of sales — would “lose its bite”. Inspired, I spent some time in the late 2000s deliberately¹⁴ tweaking Amazon’s “recommended for you” lists, rating books I owned in the hope Jeff Bezos would find me the perfect novel — until I realised he did not care. Amazon, then as now, would rather sell me more of what I have just bought, or the latest bestsellers, than algorithmically analyse my taste in media and identify a handful of items at the underpopulated intersection¹⁵ of “Bill Murray movies” and “fiction by Richard Ford¹⁶”.

但自从9年前克里斯•安德森(Chris Anderson)用一部《长尾理论》(The Long Tail)让所有的营销人员兴奋起来以后，个性化的前景就有些黯然失色。在书中，安德森概述了需求曲线末端销量较低的产品潜藏的利润，并警告“二八定律”(80/20 rule)，也就是粗略假设20%的产品产生80%的销售额的定律将“部分失效”。受到启发后，我在2000年代晚期特意对我已在亚马逊(Amazon)上购买的书进行评分，好让它更换“相关推荐”清单，期望杰夫•贝索斯(Jeff Bezos)能帮我找到最好的小说，直到我意识到，他根本不在乎这事。和现在一样，亚马逊更想向我兜售更多我刚刚买到的书，或者最新的畅销书，而不是利用算法分析我对媒体的品味，找出几本同时与“比尔•默里(Bill Murray)的电影”和“理查德•福特(Richard Ford)的小说”相关的小众书推荐给我。

Amazon’s attitude makes sense. Most companies stick with mass production and common product configurations¹⁷, for technical or commercial reasons. Even Google— which commands even more data with which to personalise its services — touts¹⁸ its Android mobile phone operating system under the slogan “Be together. Not the same”. Tilting¹⁹ gently at Apple, the advertising²⁰ plays to the idea that each Android user is an individual, but also part of a like-minded crowd. In reality, Google has to ensure its software works across the greatest number and range of devices, safe from malfunctions²¹, abuses and piracy²². The paradox²³ is neatly²⁴ summed up in one poster showing a crowd of Android robots, each differently dressed and equipped. Underneath²⁵, however, they are all still the same robot.

亚马逊的态度有其道理。许多企业出于技术或者商业的原因，坚持按照一般性产品配置进行大规模生产。即使是掌握了更多数据、因此可以据此对产品进行个性化的谷歌(Google)，对其Android手机操作系统的宣传语也是“和而不同”(Be together. Not the same)。这条广告温和地对苹果(Apple)进行了抨击，展现的理念是每个Android用户不仅是个体，也是思想相似的群体的一部分。然而事实上，谷歌必须确保它的软件能在数量和款型最多的设备上正常运行，不会出现失灵、滥用和盗版问题。这其中的矛盾在一幅海报上得到了精妙的总结，海报上有一群Android机器人，每一个的穿着和装备都不同。然而，在外表之下，它们依旧是相同的机器人。

Anita Elberse underlined in her recent book Blockbusters — which takes issue with the “long tail” thesis — that companies still mine a great deal of money from a few products that everybody wants to buy. “Because people are inherently social,” she wrote, “they generally find value in reading the same books and watching the same television shows and movies that others do.”

阿妮塔•埃尔贝斯(Anita Elberse)最近的著作《大片效应》(Blockbusters)对长尾理论提出了异议，认为企业依然能依靠人人都想购买的少数商品赚得盆满钵满。“因为人天生是社会性的，”她写道，“他们通常会从阅读其他人读过的书，观看其他人看过的电视剧和电影中寻找价值。”

In fact, research suggests an over-tailored pitch turns customers off. Either they find it too spookily precise, or — as Stanford marketing²⁶ professor Itamar Simonson has written — they sense that, because it is so bespoke²⁷, it will not be a good deal.

事实上，研究表明过度定制的销售策略会让消费者望而却步。要么是他们觉得定位过于精确，所以心生畏惧，要么就像斯坦福大学(Stanford)营销学教授伊塔马尔•西蒙森(Itamar Simonson)所写的那样，因为定制度太高，消费者感觉不划算。

Generalisation will continue to be a useful business tool. More precise data will allow companies to generalise better. But the capacity for confusion will remain — in part because nobody fits neatly into just one category.

泛化以后仍将是一个有用的商业工具。更精确的数据能让企业更好地泛化。但困惑还将继续存在，部分原因是没人能严丝合缝地被归入一种类别。

One of my favourite stand-up comedy lines comes from a joke in which God toys with the human race he is creating: “I know! I’ll make seven sexes and tell them there are only two!” Lacking His omniscience²⁸, companies, generally speaking, would be wise to continue to rely on humans to do their own personalisation.

我最喜欢的单人脱口秀台词来自一个笑话，上帝戏耍他创造的人类：“我知道啦！我会创造7种性别，然后告诉他们只有两种！”没有上帝的全知，通常来说，继续让人们自己进行个性化才是企业的明智之举。