In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announces yet another fiscal¹ stimulus².

在日本，首相安倍晋三(Shinzo Abe)宣布了又一轮财政刺激。

In Europe, economists³ nod ap-provingly when the euro group waives⁴ fines on Spain — which, despite years of growth, still runs deficits⁵ way higher than the bloc’s rules allow. In the US, both presidential candidates promise more government spending.

在欧洲，当欧元区对西班牙罚款时——尽管经历多年增长，西班牙赤字规模仍远高于欧元区允许的范围——经济学家们表示赞同。在美国，两位总统候选人均承诺增加政府支出。

So it is clear that attempts, however tentative, to cut spending and pay down debt have given way to renewed enthusiasm for policies such as these, that are intended to boost demand instead. This is dangerous.

因此，削减支出并偿还债务的努力（即使是暂时的），显然已经让路给对此类旨在提升需求的政策的新一轮热情。这非常危险。

If governments resort to sky-high debt and negative interest rates, despite moderate growth and normalised capacity utilisation, in an upswing, what will they do if and when their economies weaken again?

如果各国政府在经济上行、增长温和而且产能利用正常化时，还要诉诸于高额举债和负利率，那在经济再次低迷的时候，他们怎么办？

Especially in Europe and Japan, policy-makers have been trying relentlessly⁷ to generate growth through bank lending and fiscal borrowing.

尤其是在欧洲和日本，政策制定者一直不遗余力地试图通过银行放贷和财政举债来推动经济增长。

The Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank have turned interest rates negative to punish banks that fail to convert their cash reserves into loans.

日本央行(BoJ)和欧洲央行(ECB)依靠负利率来惩罚那些未能将自己的现金储备转化为贷款的银行。

At the same time, these central banks are buying huge amounts of government and corporate⁸ bonds. The resulting low, or negative, interest rates help governments to continue running large deficits.

与此同时，这些央行购买了大量的政府债券和企业债券。由此导致的低利率（或负利率）帮助政府继续累积巨额赤字。

Many economists support such policies: if the private sector⁹ does not borrow, they argue, then the public sector must do so to generate demand.

许多经济学家支持此类政策：他们辩称，如果私人部门没有借债，那么公共部门就必须借债以产生需求。

Not surprisingly, however, expansionary monetary¹⁰ policies have done little to fuel bank lending and private-sector borrowing.

然而，扩张性货币政策并没有促进银行放贷和私人部门借债，这并不令人意外。

Reviving lending after a financial crisis is like pushing on a string: central banks can smooth out the inevitable¹¹ debt reduction process by cutting interest rates and pumping liquidity¹² into the banking¹³ system;

在金融危机之后重振放贷就像是在“推绳子”：央行可以通过降息和向银行体系注入流动性来缓和不可避免的债务削减过程，

but they cannot totally eliminate the need for companies, banks and households to pay down excessive debt. It usually takes years; this time is no different.

但它们不可能完全消除企业、银行和家庭偿还过多债务的需要。这通常需要数年时间完成；这次也不例外。

Given that monetary policy lacks muscle, many argue that public deficit⁶ spending must compensate¹⁴ for the lack of private demand. Governments should borrow more to invest in infrastructure¹⁵ and innovation.

鉴于货币政策缺乏效力，许多人辩称，公共赤字支出必须弥补私人需求的匮乏。政府应该加大举债以投资于基础设施和创新。

These recommendations are aimed especially at countries such as Germany that have balanced their budgets.

这些建议尤其针对德国等平衡预算的国家。

But critics of “misguided austerity” are vocal¹⁶ in France and other, southern European nations, too. In their view, the eurozone’s caps on public deficits and debt have only made the crisis worse.

但对“不当紧缩”的批评声在法国和南欧国家也不绝于耳。在他们看来，欧元区设置公共赤字和债务上限只是加剧了危机。

This story is simply not supported by facts.

这种说法没有事实根据。

Debt levels have continued to rise since the financial crisis in most developed countries. In both the US and the eurozone, total non-financial sector debt (public and private) increased from about 225 per cent of gross domestic product in 2007 to 250 per cent in 2015.

自金融危机以来，大多数发达国家的债务水平持续上升。在美国和欧元区，非金融领域（包括公共和私人部门）的债务总额与GDP的比值从2007年的225%，升至2015年的250%。

Most of this was in the public sector. If growing debt could fuel growth, we would be fine.

大多数债务增加发生在公共部门。如果增加债务能够促进增长，我们现在会过得很好。

We are not. More debt clearly is not the solution to the west’s growth problem. The answer must be to strengthen our economies’ potential to create more and better jobs.

事实并非如此。增加债务显然不是西方增长问题的解决之道。解决办法必须是增强我们经济创造更多更好工作岗位的潜力。

Sure, structural¹⁷ reforms feature among the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and many central banks. Back in the real world, policymakers focus almost exclusively on policies to boost demand.

当然，国际货币基金组织(IMF)、经合组织(OECD)以及许多央行提出了结构性改革的建议。然而回到真实世界，政策制定者的注意力几乎完全放在提升需求的政策。

Many economists who support this view argue that structural reforms work only in the long run. In the short term, they may even be counterproductive because they widen the gap between supply and demand in an economy.

许多支持这种做法的经济学家辩称，结构性改革只有在长期才会奏效。短期而言，它们甚至可能适得其反，因为它们扩大了经济供需差距。

Some look askance at structural reforms, too, claiming they improve the competitiveness and export performance of one economy only at the expense of its trading partners.

有些人还对结构性改革有所质疑，他们宣称结构性改革只能以牺牲贸易伙伴为代价提升经济竞争力和出口。

This is muddled¹⁸ thinking. Policy measures that improve productivity and innovation are good for growth irrespective of how open an economy is.

这种想法很糊涂。无论经济开放程度如何，提高生产率和促进创新的政策措施都有利于增长。

The lesson we should have learnt from the post-crisis years is that demand-boosting policies on their own cannot return our economies to sustainable growth. Monetary policies are not very effective.

我们应该从危机后这几年汲取的教训是，促需求政策本身不可能让我们的经济恢复可持续增长。

Fiscal policies can certainly help — but only if they trigger investment and innovation and enable structural reforms.

货币政策的效果不太好。财政政策当然有所帮助，但只有在触发投资和创新以及实现结构性改革的情况下才会起作用。

But this is not what happened. While total government debt in the eurozone jumped by about Euro3tn between 2007 and 2015, public investment spending actually fell by about Euro20bn.

但实际情况并非如此。尽管从2007年到2015年欧元区政府债务总额飙升了大约3万亿欧元，但公共投资支出实际上下降了约200亿欧元。

Meanwhile, structural reforms came to be considered a nice-to-have rather than the foundation of sustainable growth.

与此同时，结构性改革逐渐被视为是锦上添花，而不是可持续增长的根本基础。

Greater innovation and higher productivity remain the safest routes to restored growth and wealth generation.

加大创新和提高生产率依然是恢复增长和创造财富的最安全的途径。

And this needs open markets, tax incentives¹⁹ for investment and a well-qualified workforce²⁰ — not ever more fiscal spending and central bank cash injections.

这需要开放的市场、投资税收激励措施以及胜任工作的劳动大军——而不是无止尽的财政支出和央行注资。