Warren Buffett once observed that, “When a management with a reputation for brilliance¹ tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains² intact.” So what happens when an investor³ with a holy reputation tackles an unholy task?

沃伦?巴菲特(Warren Buffett)有一次发表这样的见解：“当一个以优秀著称的管理层接手一个以基本面糟糕闻名的企业时，往往是后者的声誉会保留下来。”那么，当一位有着圣人美誉的投资者接手一项不神圣的任务时会怎样呢？

One answer was given this week by Kraft Heinz, in which Mr Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway is a leading investor. It withdrew a $143bn attempt to take over Unilever amid hostility⁴ to its relentless⁵ approach to cutting costs and jobs. Mr Buffett, who sits on Kraft Heinz’s board, clearly wanted his reputation for saintliness to remain intact.

上周卡夫亨氏(Kraft Heinz)给出了一个答案，巴菲特旗下的伯克希尔哈撒韦(Berkshire Hathaway)是该公司的领先投资者。卡夫亨氏放弃了以1430亿美元收购联合利华(Unilever)的计划，这件事的背景是卡夫亨氏无情削减成本和裁员的战略引发敌意。在卡夫亨氏董事会拥有一席的巴菲特，显然希望他的圣人名誉保留下来。

Paul Polman, Unilever’s Dutch chief executive, runs the multinational⁶ as an exemplar of sustainability and stakeholder capitalism⁷ rather than the pure shareholder⁸ variety, and the abortive⁹ bid pitched two of Mr Buffett’s instincts against each other. One is to invest in processed food and drink companies such as Coca-Cola and Kraft Heinz with reliable global brands; the other is to be liked.

联合利华的荷兰籍首席执行官保罗?波尔曼(Paul Polman)执掌这家跨国公司的方式，堪称可持续性和利益相关者资本主义的典范（而非纯粹的股东资本主义），而这笔流产的收购让巴菲特的两种本能发生矛盾：一是投资于有着可靠全球品牌的加工食品和饮料公司，例如可口可乐(Coca-Cola)和卡夫亨氏；二是招人喜欢。

The latter does not bother Jorge Paulo Lemann, the Brazilian billionaire whose 3G Capital private equity¹⁰ firm is cutting through the food and drink industry. As growth has slowed nearly to a halt thanks to price deflation and competition from makers¹¹ of healthier fare, 3G has reacted by rolling up consumer groups and slashing¹³ budgets.

后面一点不影响巴西亿万富翁若热?保罗?雷曼(Jorge Paulo Lemann)，他的私人股本公司3G资本(3G Capital)正驰骋于食品和饮料行业。随着价格通缩以及更健康食品生产商的竞争导致行业增速几乎停滞，3G资本的反应是收购消费品集团并大幅削减预算。

It troubles Mr Buffett and so it should, for it strikes at the heart of how he built his company, and his unique investment record. “At Berkshire, we only go where we are welcome,” he promised in his 2015 letter to shareholders¹⁴ in a defensive¹⁵ passage about how he works with 3G despite their conflicting methods. If nothing else, it displayed the tension in his own mind.

这让巴菲特感到苦恼，他应该如此，因为这直击他打造企业的方式和他的独特投资记录。他曾在2015年的致股东信中承诺：“在伯克希尔，我们只投资于我们受欢迎的公司，”这段为自己辩护的文字讲述他如何与3G合作，尽管双方在方法上存在分歧。即使没有别的意义，这至少显示了他内心的矛盾。

It was once easier to be nice. Although Berkshire Hathaway has made much of its money in insurance, Mr Buffett was happiest investing in consumer brands, particularly in the US, with a “moat” to protect them: they were less vulnerable to competition because people always needed to eat, drink and buy household products, and instinctively¹⁶ turned to familiar names.

曾几何时，要做到彬彬有礼较为容易。尽管伯克希尔哈撒韦在保险业赚了大钱，但让巴菲特最高兴的是投资于消费品牌，尤其是在美国，这些品牌简直像是有一条“护城河”在守卫它们：它们不那么容易遭遇竞争，因为人们总是需要吃喝和购买家用品，而且总是会本能地转向熟悉的品牌。

A quarter century ago, his biggest non-financial investments — the “sainted seven” — were brands that included See’s Candies and Nebraska Furniture Mart. The sweet spot emerged in the 1980s as US companies started to go global. In his 1989 shareholder letter, he noted¹⁸ that overseas sales of Coca-Cola, in which he had just raised his stake, were “virtually exploding”.

25年前，他的最大几笔非金融投资——被称为“七圣徒”(sainted seven)——包括时思糖果(See’s Candies)和内布拉斯加家具卖场(Nebraska Furniture Mart)等品牌。上世纪80年代出现了特别有利的时机，当时美国企业开始走向全球。在巴菲特1989年的致股东信中，他指出可口可乐（他刚刚增持了该公司的股份）的海外销售“几乎是在爆炸性增长”。

Mr Buffett embodies¹⁹ his belief in food brands. He drinks several cans of Coke a day, often accompanied by potato sticks made by Utz, a Pennsylvania company he has discussed buying, and picks up breakfast from McDonald’s on his drive to work. He ingests as he invests.

巴菲特践行着他对食品品牌的信念。他每天喝几罐可口可乐，经常搭配宾夕法尼亚州Utz公司生产的薯条（他曾讨论收购那家公司），在驱车上班时顺路买一份麦当劳(McDonald’s)的早餐。他投资于自己吃喝的品牌。

He used to enjoy another advantage: owning strong brands in growing markets meant that he could leave the executives who ran them alone, rather than ripping up their way of operating. “Our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs?.?.?.?can maximise both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive²⁰ from their jobs,” he wrote last year.

他曾经拥有另一项优势：拥有增长型市场的强大品牌意味着，他可以让公司高管们独立经营，而不去扰乱他们的经营方式。他去年写道：“我们的任务只是创建一个环境，让这些首席执行官们……能够把他们的管理有效性和他们从工作中获得的快乐最大化。”

But the food and drink business has developed in ways that makes such cosiness²¹ impossible to sustain. Companies such as Unilever and Nestlé are larger and more global — collections of billion-dollar brands rather than owners of one or two. They are run by a global cadre: the top two executives at Kraft Heinz hail from Brazil.

但食品和饮料行业的发展让这种安乐变得不可能持续。联合利华和雀巢(Nestlé)这样的公司规模变得更大，也更全球化，它们旗下有一系列价值数十亿美元的品牌，而不是仅仅拥有一两个品牌。它们由一个全球管理团队经营：卡夫亨氏的两名级别最高的高管来自巴西。

The industry has also stopped growing. The international acceleration²² has given way to falling sales at some companies and lacklustre expansion at others. Nestlé last week announced a “time out” from annual organic sales growth target of between 5 and 6 per cent. Even before Kraft Heinz’s bid, Mr Polman had adopted 3G’s cost-cutting mantra at Unilever.

这个行业也停止了增长。加快国际化已经让位于一些公司销售额下滑，还有一些公司扩张乏力。雀巢最近宣布，5%到6%的年度有机销售增长目标“需要停一停”。甚至在卡夫亨氏出价之前，波尔曼就在联合利华借鉴了3G资本削减成本的理念。

Hence Mr Buffett’s hesitation²³. His investments alongside 3G Capital first in Heinz and then Kraft have been highly profitable but sit uncomfortably with his preference for maximising happiness. Kraft Heinz has shed 13,000 jobs since the companies merged¹⁷ two years ago — as Mr Buffett says, 3G specialises in “eliminating many unnecessary costs?.?.?.?very promptly²⁴”.

这就是为什么巴菲特犹豫不决。他与3G资本先是在亨氏、后来在卡夫的投资获利颇丰，但这与他最大化快乐的偏好相悖。自两家公司在两年前合并以来，卡夫亨氏已裁员1.3万人，正如巴菲特所言，3G资本专长于“消除很多不必要的成本……而且非常神速”。

The Unilever bid has confronted him with a choice. He either has to behave with naked aggression²⁵ in the industry he knows best or find other outlets²⁶ for Berkshire’s capital. I doubt whether he could change personality at the age of 86 even if he wanted to, so he must amend²⁷ his investment strategy.

收购联合利华的计划让他面临一个选择。他要么不得不用赤裸裸的攻击性在自己最了解的行业呼风唤雨，要么为伯克希尔哈撒韦的资本找到其他投资对象。我怀疑86岁高龄的他能否改变性格（即便他想改），因此他必须修改自己的投资战略。

He is doing so. Berkshire holds 9 per cent of Coca-Cola but it has shed investments in Procter & Gamble and Walmart, and the “sainted seven” consumer companies have been overtaken in importance by a “powerhouse five” of industrial holdings. They include BNSF, the US railroad group that he acquired in 2009, and Lubrizol, which produces speciality chemicals.

他正在这么做。伯克希尔哈撒韦仍持有可口可乐9%股权，但它减持了宝洁(Procter & Gamble)和沃尔玛(Walmart)的股权，如今工业企业“五大金刚”的重要性取代了“七圣徒”消费品公司。这“五大金刚”包括巴菲特于2009年收购的美国铁路运营商北伯林顿铁路公司(BNSF)和特种化学品制造商路博润(Lubrizol)。

Neither makes tasty snacks but both meet his aim of investing in “large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires”. They are also growing profitably without the need to slash¹² costs and jobs. The food and drink industry used to be like that but it is no longer sweet enough for Mr Buffett.

这两家公司都不生产好吃的零食，但都符合他投资于“满足基本需求和愿望的大企业”的目标。此外，它们都在盈利状态下增长，而无需削减成本和就业。食品和饮料行业曾经如此，但该行业对巴菲特而言已经不够诱人了。