In the beginning — and by that I mean, say, 20 years ago — all was simple. The internet belonged to everyone and no one. It was a space free of state interference, a place for individuals to make their voices heard. The billions upon billions of digital connections defied national borders or crusty arguments about competing systems of political organisation¹. Oh, and the web promised untold² riches for the technology geeks of Silicon³ Valley and beyond.

起初（我的意思是说，比如，20年前），一切都很简单。互联网属于每一个人，又不属于任何人。它是一个不受政府干预的空间，是一个让个人的声音得到聆听的地方。数不清的数字化连接打破了国家之间的边界，也化解了关于不同政治组织体系的持久争论。还有，互联网还曾为硅谷和硅谷以外的科技极客们许下数不清的财富。

This idealised story of cyber space as an independent, anarchic realm still has great resonance⁴. To suggest there might be a need for national regulation is to be accused of “Balkanisation” of the one truly global community. To blame Google or Facebook for publishing vile⁵ propaganda soliciting⁶ the murder of innocents is to challenge the liberties of everyone with a smartphone or a tablet.

这种将网络空间视为独立的无政府王国的理想化说辞，仍能引起很多人共鸣。暗示各国或许有必要对网络空间实施监管，你会被指控为将这个真正全球化的社区“分裂化”。谴责谷歌(Google)或Facebook发布邪恶的宣传内容、鼓动别人去滥杀无辜，你就是挑战每个拥有智能手机或平板电脑的人的自由。

You can see why. The web has been a source of empowerment and freedom. It serves as an ally of the individual against the overmighty and a channel of influence for those denied a say. It has broken the information monopoly of the elites⁷ and nurtured⁸ new communities across borders. It is completing the global political awakening⁹ that began with satellite television.

可以看到这其中的原由。互联网是一个赋予人们力量和自由的地方。它是个人的盟友——共同对抗强权，是被剥夺发言权的人们发挥影响力的渠道。它打破了精英的信息垄断，并催生了新的跨国界社区。它正在完成始于卫星电视的这场全球政治觉醒。

It is no accident that the governments most eager to control the web have been those most fearful of liberty and democracy. Wherever you see an unpleasant autocrat¹⁰ you will find teams of technicians censoring¹¹ social networks and shutting down digital dissent¹².

最急于控制互联网的政府也是最害怕自由和民主的政府，这一点并非偶然。只要是有讨厌的独裁者存在的地方，你就会看到由技术人员组成的团队，在审查社交网络、消灭数字世界中的异见。

There has, of course, been an element of pretence¹³. Some rules have always applied¹⁴. No one complains when websites promoting brazen¹⁵ criminality are shut down, when child pornography is expunged¹⁶ or when cyber fraudsters are caught. Democracy distinguishes between liberty and licence — free speech does not extend to shouting “fire” in a crowded theatre.

这其中当然一直存在托辞的成分。有些规则始终是适用的。当煽动无耻罪行的网站被关闭时、当儿童色情内容被清除时、或者当网络诈骗分子被抓住时，没有人抱怨。民主制度懂得自由和肆意妄为的不同——言论自由并不适用于在拥挤的剧院里喊“着火了”的情况。

For their part, the technology companies have positioned themselves adroitly¹⁷. Even as they have become global behemoths, they have cast themselves as guardians¹⁸ of the powerless against the state. When Apple refuses a legal request to break the encryption on one of its expensive gadgets¹⁹, it wraps itself in the mantle²⁰ of freedom.

科技公司一直娴熟地掌握着自己的定位。即便它们已成了全球巨无霸，它们仍将自己定位为对抗国家的无权者的守护人。当苹果(Apple)拒绝破解其一个昂贵手机上加密文件的法律要求时，它把自由当作了自己的挡箭牌。

When Google or Facebook are accused of publishing illegal incitements to violence they claim, straight-faced, that they are not media companies at all. No, they are libraries or post offices — mere²¹ agents at the mercy of their own algorithms. Of course, if someone else complains about this or that web page they will consider taking it down — and then expect applause for their social responsibility.

当谷歌或Facebook被控发布煽动暴力的非法内容时，它们一本正经地声称它们根本不是传媒公司。不，它们是图书馆或邮局，它们不过是任自己的算法摆布的代理人。当然，如果其他人投诉这个或那个网页，它们会考虑撤下该网页，并且期待人们为它们的社会责任感鼓掌欢呼。

These nonsenses are born of a mindset that says such companies must be set above the rest of us. After spending a recent weekend with a significant slice of the Silicon Valley set, I think they actually believe their own advertising²²

这种荒谬逻辑出自这样一种思维，即这些公司必须高于我们其他人。在最近与一些硅谷重要人士度过一个周末之后，我认为他们实际上相信他们自己推销的说法。

The web cannot pay homage²³ to national preferences or cultural sensitivities. Why should mere politicians decide where, for example, the border should be set between national security and the right to publish videos delineating the finer points of bomb-making?

互联网不能服从国家的喜好或者文化敏感性。区区政治人士凭什么决定，比如，国家安全与发布解释炮弹制作细节视频的权利之间的界线何在？

By these lights, Apple has a stronger claim than government or the courts to decide if society is better served by unbreakable encryption or by arrangements to allow law enforcement agencies access to iPhones when they are chasing down terrorists.

从这些角度出发，苹果公司比政府或法庭更有权决定哪一种情况对社会更有利——无法破解的加密方式，还是让执法机构在追击恐怖分子时能够访问iPhone。

So you must be on the side of the “deep state”, is the response to seditious thoughts otherwise. To suggest, say, that the spooks be permitted to monitor the digital traffic of extremists such as those responsible for the Manchester and London murders is to be in favour of “mass surveillance”.

对于不这样认为的煽动性观点，回应是：那么你一定是站在“暗深势力”(deep state)那一边了。比如，认为应该允许特工们监测极端分子（比如那些对曼彻斯特和伦敦袭击事件负责的人）的网络动向，就是支持“大规模监控”。

In this Alice in Wonderland world, the technology companies scrape every detail of personal information from the accounts of their users in order to sell it on to advertisers. Then they rail against any state intrusion as a charter for snoopers or a march towards authoritarianism²⁴.

在这个犹如“爱丽丝梦游仙境”的颠倒世界里，科技公司从用户账号里挖掘每一丝个人信息，为的是将这些信息卖给广告商。然而它们却怒斥任何政府干预，称这是在容许窥探个人隐私，或称这是朝威权主义迈出的一步。

In truth, of course, the anarchic promise of an internet under the benign²⁵ oversight²⁶ of entrepreneurs, innovators and well-meaning geeks was always an unachievable ideal. Today’s web is dominated by a handful of global corporations whose self-serving sense of “otherness” has become an excuse to avoid the responsibilities demanded of everyone else. One-time disrupters — think of Amazon — are now rent seekers.

事实上，对互联网的如下无政府主义期许：互联网处于创业家、创新者和善意极客的良性监督之下，当然是一个无法实现的理想。今天的互联网由少数几家跨国公司主宰，这些公司自私地以“特别”自居，这是它们回避其他每个人都要承担的责任的借口。曾经的颠覆者——想想亚马逊(Amazon)——现在成了寻租者。

This market power — Google has three-quarters of global search; Google and Facebook together account for three-fifths of digital advertising revenues — allows the companies to set their own tax rates, to shut out competitors, and to choose what rules to apply.

谷歌掌握着全球搜索的四分之三；谷歌和Facebook两家占数字广告收入的五分之三——这样的市场能量让这些公司设定自己的税率、将竞争对手排除在外、并自行选择遵守什么规则。

The answer provided by the economics textbook is to break them up. No such concentrations of power would be tolerated in other sectors²⁷ of the economy — witness past antitrust rulings in the oil and telecoms sectors. We also need, though, a statement of political intent: they cannot operate beyond the values and standards of our societies.

经济学课本提供的答案是将这些公司拆分。在经济的其他领域，根本不会允许市场能量如此集中——看看石油和电信业过去的反垄断裁决就明白了。然而，我们也需要声明政治意图：这些公司不能凌驾于我们社会的价值观和标准之上。

For a nation such as Britain, under attack from terrorists who have been inspired by propaganda on the web, there will never be a “right” answer on where to fix the balance between security and privacy, or free speech and licence. It seems clear enough, though, that this is a judgment²⁸ that should be made in Westminster rather than on some Californian campus. Some call this Balkanisation. I think democratisation is a better description.

对于像英国这样，遭遇受网络宣传启发的恐怖分子袭击的国家，如何确定安全和隐私、或者言论自由和肆意妄为之间的平衡，永远没有一个“正确”答案。然而，有一点似乎很清楚，做出这个判断的应该是威斯敏斯特，而不是一些身在加利福尼亚州大学校园的人。一些人说这是“分裂化”。我认为，更合适的说法是民主化。