In the debate about how to understand the rise of anti-globalism — is it most deeply driven by cultural or economic anxiety — there is little disagreement that the heartlands of support for Donald Trump¹, Brexit and other anti-establishment movements were areas of marked industrial decline such as the US Rust² Belt or northern England.

围绕如何理解反全球化主义崛起的辩论（这个现象最深层的驱动因素是文化还是经济方面的焦虑？），各方至少对于一点没有什么异议，那就是支持唐纳德.特朗普(Donald Trump)、英国退欧和其他反建制运动的心脏地带，也是出现显著工业衰败的地区，比如美国锈带或者英格兰北部。

These areas have been deindustrialising for a long time.

这些地区的去工业化已经持续了很久。

The end of the old manufacturing sectors³ — and the disappearance⁴ of plentiful⁵ and reasonably well-paid jobs for low-skilled men — started in the 1970s, with British industry going through the most rapid change of all in the 1980s.

老制造业走上末路，低技能男子有望获得的大量且报酬相当不错的工作岗位消失，这一切始于上世纪70年代；英国工业在上世纪80年代经历了最为急剧的变化。

But we should note that everywhere, it was not the amount produced by factories that fell — it didn’t — but that production could increasingly happen with fewer workers thanks to technological⁶ change.

但我们应该注意到，无论是在哪里，工厂的产出并未下降，而是技术变革使得达到相同产量所需要的工人减少了。

Diane Coyle writes movingly in the FT about the her Lancashire home town which saw huge losses of factory jobs in the late 1970s.

黛安.科伊尔(Diane Coyle)在英国《金融时报》撰文，深情描述了兰开夏郡(Lancashire)的故乡小镇是如何在上世纪70年代末经历工厂就业岗位的大规模流失的。

Her main point is that the economic damage to such communities, and the anger it engendered⁷, came long before the immigration that was such a big factor in the Brexit debate.

她的主要观点是，这些社区所受的经济损害以及因此产生的愤怒，在移民问题成为英国退欧辩论中的一大议题之前早就出现了。

And that it was caused not by globalisation but by automation — and the catastrophic failure by the UK and other western governments to deliver on the most basic task of a democracy: insure people against a system-wide shock that they could not have foreseen or prevented.

其诱因并不是全球化，而是自动化——以及英国和其他西方国家政府在履行民主政体的最基本任务上出现了灾难性的失败：保护人民免受他们无法预见或者预防的系统性冲击的伤害。

There is evidence, however, that the China shock has made things worse, and prompted the upsurge in support for anti-globalist politics.

然而，有证据表明中国冲击让情况变得更糟，引发了反全球化政治的人气高涨。

Economists⁸ have analysed the US election results and found that the swing in the voting shares towards the Republican party since 2000 was larger in areas that were hit harder by Chinese import penetration⁹ after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.

经济学家们分析了自2001年中国加入世贸组织(WTO)以来几次美国大选的结果，发现自2000年以来，在那些被来自中国的进口渗透冲击比较严重的地区，投票立场的转变（从投民主党转为投共和党）比例更大。

For example, the findings suggest that had Chinese import growth been 25% smaller, they calculated, Mrs Clinton would have won Wisconsin and Michigan.

比如，这些经济学家的推算似乎表明，如果来自中国的进口增长比实际水平低25%，希拉里.克林顿(Hillary Clinton)将能够拿下威斯康辛州和密歇根州。

The same seems to hold true in Britain.

同样的规律似乎也适用于英国。

Italo Colantone and Piero Stanig establish that regions that have been more exposed to the recent surge of manufacturing imports from China, due to their historical industry specialisation, show systematically¹⁰ higher Leave vote shares.

伊塔洛.科兰托内(Italo Colantone)和皮耶罗.斯塔尼格(Piero Stanig)证实：一些地区由于历史性的专业化工业，受近期来自中国的制造业进口激增的影响更大，这些地区系统性地表现出更高比例的人群投票选择退欧。

We claim that this causal effect is driven by the displacement¹¹ determined¹² by globalisation in the absence of effective compensation of its losers.

我们主张，驱动这种因果关系的是在缺乏对全球化的输家进行有效补偿的情况下，全球化所造成的取代效应。

The same researchers have earlier found a similar link between exposure to Chinese import competition and support for nativist parties across European regions.

此前这两名研究人员还在欧洲各个地区发现，受到中国产品竞争的程度，与本土主义政党得到的支持率存在类似关联。

So the China shock mattered.

因此，中国冲击的确事关重大。

But the forward march of technology means that even without it, similar disruptions should be expected as the consequence¹³ of increased automation over time.

但是不可阻挡的技术进步意味着，即使没有中国冲击，随着自动化程度逐渐提高，类似的冲击也可以预见。

Which raises the question of what governments must do about it.

这就提出了一个问题，政府针对这种情况必须采取什么行动呢？

Not restrict trade, as Chad Bown explains: cancelling trade agreements does not do much to help displaced workers (though enforcing them better might), and there is little in modern trade deals that stops governments from enacting¹⁴ domestic policies to mitigate¹⁵ the harm for those on the losing side, such as better healthcare provision in the US.

答案并非限制贸易，查德.鲍恩(Chad Bown)解释道：取消贸易协定对失业工人帮助不大（不过更好地执行贸易协定或许有帮助），而且现代贸易协定中并没有什么内容阻止政府实施国内政策来缓解输家所受的伤害，比如美国可以推出更好的医疗保健服务。

The solution is not for national governments to take back control from global institutions and rules, but to use better the control they have always retained.

对国家政府来说，解决方案不是从全球机构和规则那里夺回控制权，而是更好地利用它们一直保留着的控制权。

This will, as Coyle points out, require taking place seriously: national policies . . . are delivered in specific places.

就如黛安.科伊尔指出的，这个过程需要严肃认真地进行：国家政策……在特定地区实施。

The geography of the economy was ignored.

以往经济的地理分布受到忽视。

In the presence of a regional shock, national policy should be directed to maintain strong aggregate¹⁶ demand in the affected¹⁷ locations, so that new job creation is stimulated¹⁸.

在存在地区性冲击的情况下，国家政策应该着眼于在受影响的地方保持强劲的总需求，从而刺激新的工作岗位产生。

Then there is the pedestrian but crucial need for policies to adapt people’s skills to what those new jobs may be.

然后是看似琐碎但十分关键的政策需要——让人们的技能适应新的工作。

David Leonhardt reports from New Castle, Delaware, which has had to confront post-industrial devastation . . . that now has the country’s attention.

戴维.伦哈特(David Leonhardt)在特拉华州的纽卡斯尔进行了报道。该地区不得不面对后工业时代的毁灭性打击……现在受到举国关注。

A skills and school development policy that has tapped into the area’s deep cultural connection to craftsmanship¹⁹ — to making things and working with their hands seems to have helped address both economic decline and the status anxiety that comes with it.

一项技能和学校发展政策挖掘了该地区在手艺（用双手工作和制作东西）方面的深厚文化渊源，这一政策似乎有助于同时解决经济滑坡问题和随之而来的身份焦虑。

It amounts to, in the words of Leonhardt’s headline, a jolt²⁰ of blue-collar hope.

用伦哈特的标题来说，这带来了一股蓝领的希望。

That is something mainstream²¹ politicians everywhere should aim to provide, lest the false hope peddled²² by the anti-globalists is seen as the last resort.

任何地方的主流政治人士都应以提供这一希望为己任，以防反全球主义分子所兜售的虚假希望被人们视为最后手段。